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After Tackett: Incomplete 
Contracts for Post-Employment 
Healthcare 
 
Maria O’Brien Hylton* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This is a story about a union and a private sector employer 
who repeatedly negotiated collective bargaining agreements 
which referenced side contracts which provided retirees with 
post-employment healthcare benefits.  In the early decades of 
their relationship neither the union nor the employer appear to 
have given any thought to whether or not these retiree health 
benefits in fact vested—i.e. were promised to retirees at no cost 
for the remainder of their lives.  By the 1980s1 and certainly the 
1990s2 however, as health care costs soared and life expectancy 
 
* Professor of Law, Boston University.  I am indebted to Joseph Stuligross 
of the United Steelworkers General Counsel’s Office, C.  Michael Harper, 
Susan Cancelosi, and to members of the AALS Section on Employee Benefits 
and Executive Compensation and the American College of Employee Benefits 
Counsel for comments and suggestions at various stages of this project.  Lisa 
Bothwell, Noel Chavez, Tyler Patterson and Christopher York provided 
research assistance for which I am very grateful. 
1. In 1980, life expectancy was at 73.7 years.  While in 1970, life 
expectancy at birth was at 70.8 years.  Life Expectancy at Birth, at 65 Years of 
Age, and at 75 Years of Age, by Race and Sex: United States, Selected Years 
1900-2007, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2010), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2010/022.pdf [hereinafter Life Expectancy at 
Birth].  While United States’ total health expenditures per capita tripled from 
$356 in 1970 to $1,091 in 1980.  Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United 
States & Selected OECD Countries, THE HENRY J.  KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 
12, 2011), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-health-care-
spending-in-the-united-states-selected-oecd-countries/. 
2. In 1990, life expectancy was at 75.4 years.  Life Expectancy at Birth, 
supra note 1.  By 1990 total health expenditures in the United States per capita 
was at $2,810.  Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States & 
Selected OECD Countries, supra note 1.  See also David P. Richardson, Trends 
in Health Care Spending and Health Insurance, TIAA-CREF INST. 1, 2 (2008), 
https://www.tiaa-
1
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expanded, both parties continued to regularly re-negotiate 
agreements that were silent as to this critical term.3  With time, 
predictably enough, the employer decided to eliminate this 
increasingly expensive benefit; the union objected vigorously on 
the ground that the benefit was promised to current retirees “for 
life” and could not be unilaterally terminated.  Recently, in M & 
G Polymers v. Tackett,4 the Supreme Court considered the effect 
of this silence and unanimously concluded that courts should not 
construe ambiguous contract provisions in order to create 
lifetime promises especially in the context of labor contracts 
where obligations typically cease when the agreement 
terminates. 
This paper attempts to assess the Court’s decision and to 
understand why both parties, in the face of increasing cost 
 
cref.org/public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/tr120108c.pdf (“over the 
past four decades, the growth of health care spending has outpaced overall 
growth in the economy, with health care spending rising from about 5 percent 
of GDP in 1960 to about 16 percent of GDP in 2006.”). 
3. On July 20, 1994, a letter was circulated that claimed 
 
[t]he Company shall provide health care benefits under the * 
the Comprehensive Medical Benefits Program, Exhibit B-1, 
the Dental Benefits for Employees and Dependents, Part V, 
Section E of the Pension, Insurance and Service Award 
Agreement dated July 20, 1994, to the extent that such 
benefits shall be subject to the following limitations: 1) The 
average annual company contributions to be paid for all 
health care benefits per retired employee (including their 
surviving spouse) who retires on or after May 1, 1994, shall 
not exceed $11,700 for retirees (including surviving spouses) 
under age 65 and $4,200 for retirees (including surviving 
spouse) over age 65. 
 
Exhibit 13 continued: Letter G at 1, Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 523 
F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (No. 2:07-cv-00126-GLF-NMK) [hereinafter 
Tackett I].  Nowhere in the limitations is there a reference to the vesting of 
these health care benefits. 
4. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 937 (2015) 
(holding that under ordinary contract principles a collective bargaining 
agreement was not shown to vest retirees with a right to lifetime contribution-
free health care benefits since there was no presumption in favor of vested 
retiree benefits in all collective bargaining agreements, there was no evidence 
indicating that employers and unions in the industry customarily vested 
retiree benefits, a limiting durational provision could not be disregarded, and 
silence concerning the duration of retiree benefits did not permit an inference 
that the parties intended the benefits to vest for life). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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pressure, came to the same strategic conclusion during the 
course of bargaining over many years—i.e.  that silence was 
preferable to an explicit commitment.  The union’s strategy was 
clearly influenced by the Sixth Circuit’s longstanding decision in 
Yard-Man5—a decision the Supreme Court essentially sidelines 
in Tackett.  Yard-Man was never widely adopted outside of the 
Sixth Circuit and the employer in Tackett wisely gambled that 
silence as to a critical term would force the Court to choose 
between conventional and widely accepted rules of contract 
interpretation and the nearly unique Yard-Man approach which 
presumed that in the absence of other evidence, an agreement 
that provided for retiree healthcare itself indicated an intent to 
vest lifetime contribution-free benefits. 
Tackett certainly can be understood as an instance in which 
 
5. Int’l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).  In Retirees 
at Risk, Yard-Man is summarized: 
 
The court, inferring into the situational context the relative 
bargaining positions of the parties, ruled that retiree health 
benefits extended beyond the expiration of the CBA.  It 
reasoned that retiree benefits were akin to status benefits 
that “carry with them an inference that they continue so long 
as the prerequisite status is maintained.  Thus, when the 
parties contract for benefits which accrue upon achievement 
of retiree status, there is an inference that the parties likely 
intended those benefits to continue as long as the beneficiary 
remains a retiree.” Retirees had a justified expectation of 
future welfare benefits, the court found, because retirement 
benefits are “typically understood as a form of delayed 
compensation or reward for past services” that would not 
likely “be left to the contingencies of future negotiations.” In 
other words, the retiree health benefits had already accrued 
to retirees in exchange for previously sacrificed wages and 
were not subject to later agreements.  Having inferred these 
points and considered all factors, the Sixth Circuit decided 
that the specific benefits clause vested retiree benefits 
interminably and ultimately trumped the routine three-year 
duration clause pronounced for the CBA as a whole.  Because 
the agreement contained specific duration clauses for other 
less significant benefits, the generalized duration clause 
could not defeat the specialized benefits language into which 
the court read an intent to vest. 
 
Richard L. Kaplan, Nicholas J. Powers & Jordan Zucker, Retirees at Risk: The 
Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J.  HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 287, 306-07 (2009). 
3
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traditional rules of contract interpretation triumph over special 
rules crafted for employee benefits negotiated in connection with 
labor agreements.  Tackett is also an implicit endorsement of the 
anti-Yard-Man jurisprudence of most of the other federal 
circuits.6  But, most important, Tackett provides yet more 
evidence that as financial reporting requirements7 changed and 
 
6. Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) (The 
Yard-Man inference “has never been accepted by this Court”); Senior v. NSTAR 
Elec. & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2006) (claiming that all Yard-Man 
instructs is that the Court should apply ordinary principles of contract 
interpretation and that there is no presumption of vesting); UAW v. Skinner 
Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999) (claiming that the Court does not agree 
with Yard-Man and its progeny that there is a presumption of lifetime benefits 
in the context of employee welfare benefits); Am. Fed’n of Grain Millers v. Int’l 
Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that retiree welfare 
benefits are generally not vested, and an employer can amend or terminate a 
plan providing such benefits at any time) (citing Curtiss-Wright v. 
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 75, 78 (1995).  In other cases, courts have followed 
reasoning similar to the Sixth Circuit’s but have reached different conclusions.  
E.g., Ryan v. Chromally Am. Corp., 877 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that plaintiffs' benefits did not vest under the accrual, vesting and funding 
provisions of ERISA, the governing plan documents, or the collective 
bargaining agreement between defendant and plaintiffs' union, and that the 
governing plan documents unambiguously provided the right to terminate the 
plan); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(ruling that welfare plans did not vest as a matter of law and that the former 
employees had the burden of proving that the parties intended that the 
duration of benefits was not tied to the agreement that created them.  The 
former employees relied on a faulty summary plan description given them by 
the former employer pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1022; however, the court held that 
the former employees did not show significant reliance on the summary 
sufficient to secure relief); Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that the retired employee 
did not have a vested interest in the medical benefits provided by the 
bargaining agreement between the unions and employers because the benefits 
could be terminated, no representation was made as to the length of time the 
benefits would be paid, and the trustees had the power to decrease benefits to 
maintain the fund). 
7. Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) No. 106 establishes 
accounting standards for employers’ accounting for postretirement benefits 
other than pensions, focusing principally on postretirement health care 
benefits.  Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than 
Pensions, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (Dec. 1990), 
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum106.shtml.  The Board's conclusions in 
this Statement result from the view that a defined postretirement benefit plan 
sets forth the terms of an exchange between the employer and the employee.  
Id.  In exchange for the current services provided by the employee, the 
employer promises to provide, in addition to current wages and other benefits, 
health and other welfare benefits after the employee retires.  Id.  It follows 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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increased pressure on employers (and their unions) to reveal the 
true costs associated with post-employment benefits, there were 
multiple efforts to avoid full disclosure and the expected 
backlash from shareholders.  Only when rising costs and 
longevity simply made retiree healthcare an unaffordable luxury 
did employer ambiguity evaporate leaving retirees with few 
protections. 
Thus far, the Tackett story has not ended happily for 
plaintiffs-retirees.  This is by no means the first time however 
that plaintiffs seeking to enforce claims for post-employment 
health benefits have found themselves unable to do so.8  On the 
contrary, the result in Tackett is consistent with a growing line 
of cases that refuses to put much legal weight on oral and 
written promises,9 employer custom and practice10 and even 
 
from that view that postretirement benefits are not gratuities but are part of 
an employee's compensation for services rendered.  Id.  Since payment is 
deferred, the benefits are a type of deferred compensation.  Id.  The employer's 
obligation for that compensation is incurred as employees render the services 
necessary to earn their postretirement benefits.  Id.  From a financial 
accounting perspective, in other words, incurred costs—including future 
health care expenses of current employees—should be reflected in an 
employer’s financial results when that employer assumes responsibility for 
those costs.  Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 297.  Notwithstanding the 
theoretical correctness of this approach, the result was a major increase in the 
annual cost reported by employers for their operations, in some cases, as much 
as five to ten times the cost on a pay-as-you-go basis.  Id. 
8. See generally Kaplan et al., supra note 5. 
9. Cherry v. Auburn Gear, Inc., 441 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
“lifetime” benefits extended only so long as the collectively bargained insurance 
agreement remained in effect); UAW v. Rockford Powertrain, Inc., 350 F.3d 
698 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that although the SPD purportedly conferred 
lifetime benefits on its employees, the employer’s right to modify and its 
explicit affirmation of such ability in the reservation-of-rights clause could not 
be read as promising vested healthcare benefits); Hughes v. 3M Retiree Med. 
Plan, 281 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the benefits booklet cited by 
plaintiffs was not the correct SPD, as the booklet referred participants over 
age sixty-five to a separate “Med-Supp Plan” brochure that governed plaintiff’s 
plan and contained no language even remotely suggestive of vesting.  
Furthermore, both documents contained reservation clauses reserving the 
right to amend or discontinue benefits). 
10. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (holding that lying to 
employees in the context of benefits administration violates the fiduciary 
obligation); see Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that under Varity and other Seventh Circuit precedents, “the 
employer must have set out to disadvantage or deceive its employees . . . in 
order for a breach of fiduciary duty” claim to succeed). 
5
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arguments about reliance11 in light of the enormous (and 
sometimes unexpected burden) retiree healthcare costs present 
for employers. 
One might ask why retiree health insurance matters much 
at all.  The simplest response is that, for those over age 65, it is 
often a nice add-on to Medicare coverage.  But, for retirees under 
the age of 65, alternative sources of health insurance are often 
expensive if available at all.  When retiree health coverage is 
eliminated for a current retiree, the retiree must consider his 
options. 
As Professor Cancelosi has noted: 
 
Depending on the reasons for retirement, an 
individual may not be willing or able to return to 
full-time employment to obtain active employee 
coverage.  Even if someone is both willing and 
able, an older person’s chances of returning to a 
comparable position are limited.  Employment-
based coverage, once lost, may well be gone 
forever.12 
 
11. Rockford Powertrain, 350 F.3d at 705-06 (claiming that it was 
impossible for the plaintiffs to have relied on their employer’s statements in 
making their retirement decisions, because “plaintiffs admit in their brief that 
the statements at issue were made ‘during exit interviews after the retirees 
made their decisions to retire’”); Frahm v.  Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of 
U.S., 137 F.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1998) (claiming “in federal law, a person 
cannot rely on an oral statement, when he has in hand written materials 
disclosing the truth”); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit “ERISA” Litig., 
57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that an unambiguous reservation-of-rights 
clause in the SPD eviscerated the reasonableness of plaintiff-retirees’ reliance 
on a benefits administrator’s oral interpretation of the plan that conflicted with 
the SPD). 
12. Susan E. Cancelosi, The Shifting Focus of Federal Intervention in 
Retiree Health Benefits, 13 NEV. L.J. 759, 763-65 (2013) (citations omitted).  
Cancelosi goes on to state: 
 
Without employer-provided insurance, early retirees find 
themselves in a particularly difficult position.  Adults who 
are neither age sixty-five nor disabled currently do not enjoy 
good alternatives to employer-provided health benefits.  
Group health insurance through one's work does not 
discriminate on the basis of health status; all similarly 
situated employees are similarly eligible for coverage.  The 
same applies to retiree health plans sponsored by an 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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As others have suggested,13 Tackett can easily be described 
as a “win” for traditional rules of contract interpretation.  
Indeed, as Justice Scalia pointed out during oral argument: 
 
You know, the nice thing about a contract case of 
this sort is you can’t feel bad about it.  Whoever 
loses deserves to lose.  [Laughter]  I mean, this 
thing is obviously an important feature.  Both 
sides knew it [the issue of vesting] was left 
unaddressed, so, you know, whoever loses 
deserves to lose for casting this upon us when it 
could have been said very clearly in the contract.  
Such an important feature.  So I hope we’ll get it 
 
employer.  Eligibility for coverage under such plans depends 
on retiree status, not health conditions.  Individual 
insurance, on the other hand, historically has come with no 
such protections, and insurers have routinely denied 
applications by those whom the companies perceive as poor 
risks.  Because health declines with age, those old enough to 
qualify for retirement –early or normal – often fall into the 
poor risk category.  Even if an early retiree can find an 
insurer willing to issue individual coverage, the cost may 
outstrip what the individual can afford. . . . The only 
remaining alternative is government-provided or 
government-paid care, such as that available through 
Medicare and Medicaid for certain parts of the population.  
But healthy, early retirees historically have not qualified for 
either of the safety net programs. 
 
Id.  at 763-65. 
13. Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Caddo Sheet 
Metal, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-858, 2015 WL 4032037, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 30, 2015) 
(citing to Tackett which required it to interpret the CBA “according to ordinary 
principles of contract law”); Gray v. Levi Strauss & Co., No.3:14CV634-DPJ-
FKP, 2015 WL 756747, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Tackett: 
“[Courts] interpret collective-bargaining agreements . . . according to ordinary 
principles of contract law. . . . ”); Bd. of Trs. of the Plumbers v. R. & T. Schneider 
Plumbing Co., No.1:13-CV-858, 2015 WL 4191297, at *10 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 
2015) (quoting Tackett in order to establish that interpreting collective-
bargaining agreements must be done according to ordinary principles of 
contract law); Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati Shaper Indep. Union, No.1:14-CV-
296, 2015 WL 1468464, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (quoting relevant 
language to establish that collective-bargaining agreements should be 
interpreted using ordinary principles of contract law). 
7
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right, but, you know, I can’t feel bad about it.14 
 
The union, in briefs filed since Tackett was remanded to the 
Sixth Circuit, insists that the decision stands for nothing more 
than the position that courts should not grant judgment for 
retirees on the basis of ambiguous contract language alone.15 
The longstanding relationship between the parties here 
may help explain the peculiar silence.  M & G was a party to 
both a collective bargaining agreement and a related pension 
and insurance agreement which provided for retiree health 
coverage.16  Certain employees were eligible for employer paid 
 
14. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. 
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  Justice Breyer responded by 
noting that “[w]ell, you know, the workers who discover they’ve been retired 
for five years and don’t have any health benefits might feel a little bad about 
it.”  Id. at 22. 
15. “Tackett cites Litton which holds that post-expiration obligations may 
arise from ‘express or implied’ CBA terms.  Nor does Tackett hold that general 
duration clauses automatically trump specific promises of post-expiration 
retiree healthcare.  Tackett rejects presumptions and holds that CBAs are 
subject to the ‘ordinary principles of contract law’ and ‘the parties’ intentions 
control.’”  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 20, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. 
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No.12-3329). 
16. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 931 (2015). 
Cancelosi encapsulates the fragile position of pre-65 year old retirees: 
 
Employment-based health plans for retirees and their 
dependents cover at least fifteen million individuals in the 
United States.  Retiree health insurance includes plans for 
both early retirees and Medicare-eligible retirees.  Plans for 
early retirees—in general, those at least age fifty-five but not 
yet sixty-five—typically provide primary health insurance, 
often simply a continuation of active employee coverage; 
plans for Medicare-eligible retirees are secondary to 
Medicare and provide wrap-around coverage.  For both 
groups, employment-based coverage is important.  For early 
retirees, it is critical because they typically have few, if any, 
alternatives to employer-sponsored plans.  In fact, 
individuals with a choice rarely retire before Medicare 
eligibility unless they qualify for retiree health benefits.  For 
Medicare-eligible retirees, the supplemental insurance 
available through employers often is both less expensive and 
more comprehensive than what private Medicare 
supplemental policies (often referred to as "Medigap" plans) 
offer.  When an employer reduces or terminates that 
supplemental coverage, the costs shift to retirees, who may 
not have the resources to adapt easily to new financial 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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demands. 
 
Cancelosi, supra note 12, at 759-61.  Kaplan explains the options that retirees 
possess when they are not eligible for Medicare due to being under 65 years of 
age.  Kaplan claims: 
 
One such option is health insurance through a working 
spouse . . . .  A second option is obtaining Medicare as a 
disabled person prior to reaching age sixty-five.  Someone 
who receives Social Security disability payments for twenty-
four months is eligible for Medicare, regardless of age . . . 
.Three more generally applicable options for retirees who are 
not yet eligible for Medicare include the following: 1) continue 
their former employer’s health insurance under the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
(COBRA), 2) purchase health insurance in the individual 
market, or 3) utilize a health savings account after 
retirement . . . .  [N]one of these three options adequately 
addresses the problem of early retirees who have lost their 
employer-sponsored retiree health benefits. 
 
Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 334-36. 
 Currently, Medicare is the source of health insurance for nearly 45 million 
Americans-mainly seniors ages 65 and older, but also 7 million younger adults 
with permanent disabilities.  Medicare Now and in the Future, HENRY J.  
KAISER FAM.  FOUND., (Oct. 1, 2008), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-
brief/medicare-now-and-in-the-future/.  Before Medicare was signed into law 
in 1965, about half of all seniors lacked hospital insurance.  Id.  Today, 
virtually all people ages 65 and over are covered by Medicare.  Id.  In 1966, 
enrollment in the Medicare program was less than half of what it is today, at 
19.1 million and none enrolled through permanent disabilities.  Enrollment in 
Medicare Program From 1996 to 2014, by Type of Beneficiary, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/237045/us-medicare-enrollment-figures/ 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2015).  In 1970, some 7.1 billion U.S. dollars were spent 
on the Medicare program in the United States.  Total Medicare Spending from 
1970 to 2014, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/248073/distribution-of-medicare-spending-
by-service-type/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).  While in 2013, that figure had 
risen to 581.7 billion U.S. dollars.  Id.  Cancelosi puts these figures into 
perspective, claiming that, 
 
[T]he cost of retiree health benefits weights the scale against 
their maintenance.  One study concluded that the cost of 
providing employment-based health benefits to 
retirees in 2010 would increase six percent for pre-sixty-five 
retirees and four percent for Medicare-eligible retirees, 
matching prior years' increases.  That translates to a per-
person cost of $7,596 per early retiree and $3,840 for the 
Medicare-eligible retiree, as compared to $5,184 per active 
employee for single coverage.  Even though employers have 
9
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retiree health coverage, subject to certain caps.  The trial court 
found (and this issue was not before the Supreme Court) that 
the M & G retirees were not subject to caps as they were never 
adopted at the location owned by M & G Polymers.17  The 
collective bargaining agreement was silent as to the ability of 
the employer to make changes to retiree health care coverage; 
however, the labor agreement was subject to renegotiation every 
three years as was typical in the industry.18  The Tackett 
 
largely dealt with this problem by shifting costs to retirees, 
10% of large employers surveyed in 2006 predicted that they 
were "very" or "somewhat" likely to terminate coverage 
altogether for future retirees, with another 2% predicting 
that they were "very" or "somewhat" likely to terminate 
coverage for current retirees.  A 2010 survey similarly found 
that ten percent of companies with existing retiree health 
plans were "planning to exit, and 20% are seriously 
considering this option for the future." An early 2011 study 
reported that almost 60% of surveyed large employers 
currently offering retiree plans were "rethinking" their 
programs for 2012 or 2013. 
 
Cancelosi, supra note 12, at 768-69. 
17. Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 697, 718 (S.D. 
Ohio 2012) [hereinafter Tackett II].  The plaintiff employees were divided into 
five different sub-classes.  The District Court ruled that cap letter applicability 
was only directed at future employees, and not directly beneficial to sub-classes 
one through four.  “ [T]he trial evidence places the previously ambiguous Letter 
of Understanding 2003-6 into its proper context as a going-forward document 
applicable to individuals in Subclass Five and not a document that also speaks 
to and clarifies the meaning of prior agreements governing Subclasses One 
through Four.” Id. at 717.  Further, “ [T]he document’s context teaches this 
Court that application of Letter of Understanding 2003-6 to the plaintiffs in 
the first four subclasses was a unilateral move by M&G to unlawfully 
circumvent binding agreements to obtain economic advantages.”  Id. 
18. Founded in 1942, the United Steelworkers union is North America’s 
largest industrial union with 1.2 million members and retirees.  About Us, 
UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.org/union/mission (last visited July 6, 
2015).  There are more than 1,800 local unions throughout Canada, the United 
States and the Caribbean.  One Member, One Vote, UNITED STEELWORKERS, 
http://www.usw.org/union/mission/one-member-one-vote (last visited Oct. 7, 
2015).  The United Steelworkers represent workers in a diverse range of 
industries, including atomic, chemical, education, energy and utilities, health 
care, manufacturing, metals (steel, aluminum, etc.), mining, oil, paper and 
forestry, pharmacies and pharmaceuticals, public employees, rubber (tires, 
etc.), transportation, and varied work places.  Our Industries and Work Place, 
UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.org/union/mission/industries (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2015).  From the Court record, it is clear that the United 
Steelworkers union had a practice of re-negotiating contracts every three 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
  
2016 AFTER TACKETT 327 
litigation began when the employer notified the union through a 
letter in 2006 that it intended to begin charging retirees for a 
portion of their health care and the employees responded by 
arguing they had a vested right to free retiree health care for 
life.19  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
dismissed the employees’ complaint for failure to state a claim20 
but the Sixth Circuit reversed and in so doing relied heavily on 
its own precedent in International Union, United Auto, 
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. 
Yard-Man, Inc.21  While Yard-Man guided decision making in 
 
years.  The first Insurance, Medical, Pension Disability Income and 
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits for Hourly Rated Employees packet was 
effective beginning May 15, 1991.  Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 2-3, Tackett I.  The 
next claims that effective July 20, 1994 the new terms of the benefits would 
begin.  Defendant’s Exhibit 3 at 2, Tackett I.  Then again on May 9, 1997, the 
Company issued a letter claiming that it would provide health care benefits 
under the Comprehensive Medical Benefits Program . . . . with the aforesaid 
limitations would become effective that day.  Defendant’s Exhibit 4 at 2, 
Tackett I.  Following that agreement, there was another on November 6, 2000 
to last until November 6, 2003 between M&G Polymers USA, LLC and United 
Steelworkers union to continue the benefits.  Defendant’s Exhibit 7 at 2, 
Tackett I. 
19. Tackett II, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 716-20. 
20. Tackett I, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 691 (“Count I of the amended complaint 
targets ‘specified lifetime health care benefits,’ and the specified benefits 
include sharing costs.  The retirees are entitled to an employer contribution 
toward health benefits, but they must pay premium contributions; there is 
simply no contractual right to contribution-free health benefits . . . .  The 
company’s right to terminate benefits for retiree’s failure to contribute is 
implicit.  Therefore, the evidence before this Court indicates that because the 
caps scheme has continued to apply, Defendants are correct in asserting that 
there is no breach of the CBA.”). 
21. Int’l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983) (affirming 
the district court’s holding that the retirees were entitled to continued benefits, 
but reversed the holding that appellant could not substitute cash value for the 
annuities).  Yard-Man urges that 
 
[A] general durational clause which provided that the 
collective bargaining agreement should remain in 
force until June 1, 1977 demonstrates an intent that 
all benefits described in the agreement also terminate 
at that date.  We do not agree.  The clause does not 
specifically refer to the duration of benefits.  The 
persuasive considerations we have discussed 
demonstrate that retiree benefits were intended to 
outlive the collective bargaining agreement’s life and 
outweigh any contrary implications derived from a 
routine duration clause terminating the agreement 
11
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these kinds of cases in the Sixth Circuit since 1983, very 
different approaches to dealing with contracts that lacked 
“important feature[s]”22 developed in the other federal circuits.  
 
generally.  Such an intent takes precedence over a 
non-specific, general clause. 
 
Id. at 1482-83. 
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-22, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. 
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  The oral argument reflects this 
frustration of leaving vesting silent: 
 
Justice Alito: This certainly can’t be something that didn’t 
occur to the employer or to the union.  Why did they choose 
to leave it silent? Why did they choose not to address it 
expressly? 
Ms.  Ho: I think one could consider that they didn’t express it 
directly or one could read the contract as saying there simply 
is no—silence says there is no promise of vesting here, 
because that is an extraordinary obligation for a company to 
take on. 
Justice Ginsburg: How about “Retirees will receive health 
benefits as long as they are eligible for an receiving a monthly 
pension”? Doesn’t that sound like as long as they’re getting 
the pension, they will get health benefits? 
Ms.  Ho: No, Your Honor.  Again, read in conjunction with 
either the express clause in this case or the background rule 
that the terms expire with the agreement, that doesn’t 
indicate that those—those extend.  And I think what—what 
the Sixth Circuit has done, and it did in this case, it 
instructed this Court that the mere fact that the retiree 
healthcare benefits were tied to receipt of a pension was 
sufficient to indicate vesting.  I think that essentially undoes 
what Congress did in saying you—you have to vest in 
pension; you don’t have to vest in the welfare context.  The 
Sixth Circuit essentially puts those things— 
Justice Scalia: Well, I don’t think it’s reversing that.  I think 
it’s—it’s an argument of—of contractual expression, 
contractual intent.  It says if you tie the continuing receipt of 
health benefits to the continuing receipt of retirement 
benefits, and if you know that retirement benefits survive the 
termination of the contract, right? You acknowledge that. 
Ms.  Ho: The vesting. 
Justice Scalia: It seems to suggest that—that health benefits 
continue as long as retirement benefits do.  Now, I mean, 
maybe there are other indications, but that one certainly 
seems to—seems to tie health benefits to retirement benefits. 
Ms.  Ho: I don’t think so, Your Honor.  Because I think one 
con—one consequence of that is essentially no matter what 
the parties contract or agree to, you’re always going to have 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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vesting, even though it’s the exception and not the rule, 
simply by tying the healthcare benefits to—to retirement 
status. 
Justice Ginsburg: Why do you have to—why do you have to 
do that? If you want to treat them as separate, treat them as 
separate.  Don’t tie them together.  There was nothing that 
required these two to be tied together. 
Ms.  Ho: Well, Your Honor, I think the practical reason for—
for linking those two is not to indicate vesting, but to ensure 
that the recipient is—is actually retired for purposes of 
receiving the benefits. 
Justice Kennedy: Well, I thought it was your position that 
whatever might be the outcome of these questions, the Sixth 
Circuit didn’t think that that was the right analysis, that the 
Sixth Circuit didn’t think the result could be reached without 
imposing the presumption of your argument, and so 
instructed the district court.  And that’s the issue before us. 
Ms.  Ho: That’s correct, Your Honor.  And the district court—
and the district court made clear on remand, and the Sixth 
Circuit in the second appeal, in Tackett II, explicitly 
approved, and the word the Sixth Circuit used was 
“presumption,” that the district court decided correctly in 
applying the presumption to this case. 
Justice Ginsburg: I thought that the district court on remand 
said it would have come out the same way anyway.  They said 
there are no facts that would defeat this same conclusion. 
Ms.  Ho: Correct, Your Honor.  And I—and I think that’s an 
important response to what Justice Sotomayor was pointing 
out earlier about the fact that there was a trial here.  I think 
that—that language makes clear that the trial here was 
about what—what vested, and that’s the district judge 
making clear that whatever facts there had been, it would 
have reached the same conclusion about vesting, which is the 
only issue before this Court based on the Sixth Circuit’s 
directive, as Justice Kennedy was pointing out, to apply 
Yard-Man and to apply the Yard-Man presumption. 
Justice Scalia: You know, the nice thing about a contract case 
of this sort is you can’t feel bad about it.  Whoever loses 
deserves to lose. 
(Laughter.) 
Justice Scalia: I mean, this thing is obviously an important 
feature.  Both sides knew it was left unaddressed, so, you 
know, whoever loses deserves to lose for casting this upon us 
when it could have been said very clearly in the contract.  
Such an important feature.  So I hope we’ll get it right, but, 
you know, I can’t feel bad about it. 
(Laughter.) 
Justice Breyer: Well, you know, the workers who don’t 
discover they’ve been retired for five years and don’t have any 
health benefits might feel a little bad about it. 
13
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Indeed, outside of the Sixth Circuit, most courts rejected Yard-
Man and its emphasis on the context in which labor negotiations 
took place in favor of the more conventional contract analysis of 
the sort Justice Scalia other members of the Court focused on in 
Tackett.23 
This paper seeks to explain the odd silence in both the 
collective bargaining agreements and the pension and insurance 
agreements about whether or not free-to-retirees retiree health 
benefits were vested.  The parties’ long shared history makes 
impossible a conclusion that it was simply a mistake that this 
important issue was never addressed.  On the contrary, a 
detailed review of the relationship between M & G Polymers and 
the Steelworkers Union suggests that for a long time both 
parties believed they were both better off leaving the issue 
unaddressed.  Both the union and M & G were able to avoid the 
 
Ms.  Ho: And—and Your Honor, I—I agree. 
Justice Breyer: I’m taking sides, but I want to— 
(Laughter.) 
Justice Breyer: I mean, what I’ve listened to sort of drives me 
to the conclusion where you started, decide these things 
without any presumption, period.  Ordinary contract.  Go 
read the contract.  Where it’s ambiguous, Judge, ask them for 
extrinsic evidence if they want to present it.  Decide it like 
any other case.  I started there.  Maybe I’ve heard something 
that should change my mind.  I often do change it in oral 
argument, but I haven’t yet. 
 
Id. 
23. The Sixth Circuit approached the issue of whether retiree insurance 
benefits continue beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement 
by looking at the intent of the parties.  Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.  The court 
then looked to the explicit language of the collective bargaining agreement for 
clear manifestations of intent.  Id.  The Court then analyzed the collective 
bargaining agreement using 
 
[B]asic rules of [contract] construction” to determine that 
since “[t]he [duration] clause does not specifically refer to the 
duration of benefits . . . . retiree benefits were intended to 
outline the collective bargaining agreement’s life and 
outweigh any contrary implications derived from a routine 
duration clause terminating the agreement generally.  Such 
an intent takes precedence over a non-specific, general 
clause. 
 
Id. at 1482-83. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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reckoning that FAS 10624 would have required of them.  Both 
gambled that when push came to shove and they could no longer 
avoid confronting the enormous cost free retiree health care 
represented, their “silence” could be used advantageously. 
 
II. The Mysterious Silence in Tackett 
 
A. Tackett—Years of Strategic Silence 
 
Before M & G Polymers employees were represented by the 
Steelworkers, the International Union of the United Rubber, 
Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC 
(the “URW”) represented M & G workers and employees of its 
corporate predecessors for decades.25  The URW merged with the 
Steelworkers in 1995.26  It appears as though free retiree health 
benefits were first offered to employees/union members in 
1950.27  Following years of relatively stable cost and mortality 
 
24. Financial Accounting Statement No. 106 (FAS 106) requires 
companies to accrue the cost of retiree health benefits and to record a liability 
for unfunded retiree medical costs explicitly on their financial statements, 
effective beginning for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992.  EMP. 
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS (2005), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/2009/26_Retiree-
Hlth_HEALTH_Funds-2009_EBRI.pdf.  FAS 106 applies to current and future 
retirees, their beneficiaries, and qualified dependents. 
25. The United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum Plastic Workers of America was 
founded on September 12, 1935, in Akron Ohio, the then “Rubber Capital of 
the World” and former home base for most of the major tire and rubber 
companies.  THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM PLASTIC 
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC, UNITED STEEWORKERS, 
http://uswlocal878l.com/page4.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).  In 1960, the 
URW, at its peak, had close to 200,000 members.  Kenneth N. Gilpin, Rubber 
Workers’ Union Acts to Merge with Steelworkers, N.Y.  TIMES (May 13, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/13/business/rubber-workers-union-acts-to-
merge-with-steelworkers.html.  By 1995, at the time the URW merged with 
the United Steelworkers of America, membership had shrunk to 94,000 
members.  Id. 
26. Our History, UNITED STEELWORKERS LOCAL 2003, 
http://www.usw2003.org/history.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); Rubber and 
Steel Workers Consolidate Union, WARDSAUTO (Aug. 1, 1995), 
http://wardsauto.com/news-amp-analysis/rubber-and-steel-workers-
consolidate-unions. 
27. It appears that the “1950 Pension Plan of the Company” began the 
company’s practice of providing welfare benefits.  The company and the union 
would negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement approximately every 
15
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experience, the cost of retiree health care began to increase in 
the 1980s.28  As others have noted,29 the increases in the cost of 
healthcare, especially for retirees, created several problems for 
old line manufacturing employers who often had more retirees 
than active workers.30 
 
three years.  They also negotiated a series of Master Pension, Insurance and 
Service Award Agreements with every CBA negotiation.  Individual plants 
could adopt the agreement in one of three possible ways: first, some plants 
directly participated in the “master bargaining” with the employer and became 
a party to the Master Agreement itself.  Second, some plants separately 
adopted “me to” agreements that were identical to the Master Agreement.  
And, third, some plants adopted “me too with exceptions” agreements.  Joint 
Appendix, M&G Polymers, LLC v. Tackett, 2014 WL 3746809 at *8-*23 (No. 
13-1010) (July 17, 2014). Basically the governing insurance agreements 
created a point system for employees based on age and years of service 
requirements.  Exhibit A at 3-4, Tackett I.  Employees whose age and years of 
continuous service at the time of retirement equaled ninety-five or more points 
received a full company contribution toward the cost of benefits.  Id.  
Employees with less than 95 points at the time of retirement received reduced 
benefits.  Retiree spouses and surviving spouses were entitled to the same 
benefits until death or remarriage.  Id. 
28. David Blumenthal et al., Health Care Spending—A Giant Slain or 
Sleeping?, 369:26 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2551, 2552 (2013), 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cutler/files/nejmhpr1310415.pdf (claiming 
that real per capita increases in health costs averaged 5.5% in the 1980s); 
Jonathan Cohn, Cause for Concern, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117452/rising-health-care-costs-what-it-
means-economy-obamacare (noting a quick increase in healthcare costs in the 
1980s and in the early 2000s); U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, supra note 1 (attributing the spike in healthcare costs in the late 
1980s to the United States’ accelerated growth rate). 
29. Philip Klein, Health Care Spending Spikes at Fastest Rate Since 1980 
in First Quarter of Obamacare, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/health-care-spending-spikes-at-fastest-
rate-since-1980-in-first-quarter-of-obamacare/article/2547891 (referencing the 
fact that health care spending grew at a ten percent rate in the third quarter 
of 1980); James Lubitz et al., Three Decades of Health Care Use by the Elderly, 
1965-1998, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/20/2/19.full (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) 
(detailing the spike in the oldest old). 
30. Take, for example, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.  GM could not 
survive with continuing losses and associated loss of liquidity, and without the 
governmental funding it had been receiving.  In re GMC, 407 B.R. 463, 474 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).  Historically, GM was one of the best performing 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEM”) in the U.S. market.  Id. at 476.  
But with the growth of competitors with far lower cost structures and 
dramatically lower benefit obligations, GM’s leadership position in the U.S. 
began to decline.  Id.  At least as a result of that lower cost competition and 
market forces in the U.S. and abroad (including jumps in the price of gasoline; 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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As the cost pressures mounted on employers, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) acted in 1990 and again in 
2006 to increase transparency about the true cost of retiree 
health care and other post- employment benefits.  First, in 1990, 
the FASB began requiring private sector employers to disclose 
the projected cost of future retiree health care benefits.31  Rule 
106 represented a dramatic departure from prior accounting 
practices.  As the Board explained shortly before Rule 106 went 
into effect: 
 
The Board’s conclusions in this Statement result 
from the view that a defined postretirement 
benefit plan sets forth the terms of an exchange 
between the employer and the employee.  In 
exchange for the current services provided by the 
employee, the employer promises to provide, in 
addition to current wages and other benefits, 
health and other welfare benefits after the 
employee retires.  It follows from that view that 
postretirement benefits are not gratuities but are 
part of an employee’s compensation for services 
rendered.  Since payment is deferred, the benefits 
are a type of deferred compensation.  The 
employer’s obligation for that compensation is 
 
a massive recession (with global dislocation not seen since the 1930s); a 
dramatic decline in U.S. domestic auto sales; and a freeze-up in consumer and 
commercial credit markets), GM suffered a major drop in new vehicle sales and 
in market share—from 45% in 1980 to a forecast 19.5% in 2009.  Id.  Another 
factor that contributed to GM’s bankruptcy was the fact that the company had 
obligations to an estimated 500,000 retirees.  Id. at 474.  As of March 31, 2009, 
GM employed approximately 235,000 employees worldwide; that is less than 
half of the amount of retirees.  Id. at 475. Likewise, Ford was in a similar 
position reporting that they were “hemorrhage[ing] cash in the the third 
quarter.”  Dan Carney, Ford Better Positioned to Ride out Recession, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27723139/ns/business-
autos/t/ford-better-positioned-ride-out-recession/#.VafuWu3BzGc.  Ford 
posted a $129 million loss in the third quarter and said it would eliminate 
another 2,260 jobs.  Id.  Ford, though, did not receive assistance through 
T.A.R.P.  and sold off its Jaguar and Land Rover operations in order to gain 
cash during the recession.  Meanwhile, both GM and Chrysler accepted 
T.A.R.P.  assistance. 
31. Summary of Statement No. 106, FIN.  ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. 
(Dec. 1990), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum106.shtml. 
17
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incurred as employees render services necessary 
to earn their postretirement benefits.32 
 
FAS 106 essentially required non-governmental employers 
to incorporate into current financial statements the future costs 
associated with providing retiree health care.  The result was a 
dramatic increase in reported costs.33  It is important to note that 
the real, out of pocket costs to employers were also increasing at 
this time as retirees benefited from often costly improvements 
in medical technology that led to longer lifespans and greater 
demand for medical care in retirement.34 
 
32. Id. 
33. See, e.g, Anna M. Rappaport & Carol H. Malone, Adequacy of 
Employer-Sponsored Retiree Health Benefit Programs, in PROVIDING HEALTH 
CARE BENEFITS IN RETIREMENT 72, 72-74 (Mazo et al. ed. 1994).  See also EMP.  
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 69 
(2005), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/Fnd05.Prt03.Chp26.
pdf (noting that “[a]s a result of FAS 106, and the increasing cost of providing 
retiree health benefits in general, many employers began a major overhaul of 
their retiree health benefit programs”); Kaplan, supra note 5, at 297-98 (“Faced 
with [FASB No. 106] financial statement disclosures, many companies felt 
considerable pressure to reduce the extent of their obligations, and many firms 
initiated cost-reduction strategies to that end.  The impact was calamitous for 
retirees.  Among employers with at least 200 employees, the share of such 
employers who offer any type of retiree benefits dropped from 66% in 1988 to 
35% in 2006.  Even larger employers - namely, those with at least 
1000 employees - have diminished their offerings of retiree health benefits 
steadily.”). 
34. Professor Gruber has recently concluded that “[T]he rapid rise in 
health care costs has been driven by quality-improving technological change.” 
Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 571, 603 (2008); see also Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Health 
Care Crisis and What To Do About It, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Mar. 23, 2006), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18802 (agreeing that “new medical 
technology” is the principal factor driving health care costs higher); Jonathan 
S. Skinner, The Costly Paradox of Health-Care Technology, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/518876/the-costly-
paradox-of-health-care-technology/ (discussing why it is that health care 
technology contributes to rising health care costs); Snapshots: How Changes in 
Medical Technology Affect Health Care Costs, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND.  (Mar. 2, 2007), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-how-
changes-in-medical-technology-affect/ (“Health care experts point to the 
development and diffusion of medical technology as primary factors in 
explaining the persistent difference between health spending and overall 
economic growth, with some arguing that new medical technology may account 
for about one-half  more of real long-term spending growth.”); Daniel Callahan, 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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B. Cap Letters 
 
So, employers and their unions-already scrambling to 
survive in the increasingly difficult manufacturing sector in the 
United States-faced real cost increases and were required to 
incorporate a new accounting approach that made those 
increases appear even larger.  Not surprisingly, many employers 
began to limit and/or eliminate retiree health care benefits.35  
These adjustments were easier in non-unionized sectors where 
employers simply amended existing plans without any 
organized objection from current or retired workers.36  In the 
 
Health Care Costs and Medical Technology, HASTINGS CTR. 79-82 (2008), 
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/BriefingBook/Detail.aspx?id=2
178 (“New or increased use of medical technology contributes 40-50% to annual 
cost increases, and controlling this technology is the most important factor in 
reducing them”). 
35. There has been a decline in employees with employment-based health 
insurance.  According to recent data from the Employee Benefit Research 
Institute, only 64.2% of Americans aged eighteen to sixty-four years have some 
form of employer-provided health insurance, a number that has declined from 
69.3% as recently as 2000.  Kaplan, supra note 5, at 294-95 (citing PAUL 
FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2007 CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEY 7 (Oct. 2007), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10a-20071.pdf).  Employers have 
responded by placing caps on what they were previously willing to spend on 
retiree health benefits.  FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, 
supra note 33, at 69.  “Others added age and service requirements; moved to 
some type of ‘defined contribution’ health benefit; completely dropped retiree 
health benefits for future retirees; or dropped benefits for current retirees . . . 
. ”  Id. 
36. This did not prevent private, non-unionized workers from suing in an 
effort to maintain these benefits.  Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 274 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2001); Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2001): 
 
plaintiff-retirees left employment either through the 
ordinary course of business or through early retirement 
severance packages between 1989 and 1998.  Both cases 
involved the same fact pattern, except that the Devlin 
retirees based their claims on pre-1987 SPDs, while the 
Abbruscato retirees focused on benefit plan descriptions from 
1987 and beyond.  The key difference between the two cases 
was that a newly written employee handbook (“Your 
Handbook”) introduced in 1987 was the first version to 
include a reservation-of-rights clause. . . .[T]here were three 
categories of plaintiffs across these two cases: 1) pre-1987 
19
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SPD regular retirees in Devlin whose plan lacked a 
reservation-of-rights clause, 2) “Your Handbook” regular 
retirees from 1987 forward who were subject to a reservation-
of-rights clause, and 3) early retirees whose plans also 
contained a reservation-of-rights clause.  As to the early 
retirees, the Abbruscato court found that there were intrinsic 
grounds in the plans to create ambiguity about the meaning 
of “lifetime” benefits and overturned the lower court’s 
summary judgment for Empire.  The Second Circuit deemed 
the eligibility formulas to conflict with the generalized 
reservation-of-rights clause found elsewhere in the plans. . . 
. By contrast, the same court found no such ambiguity that 
would allow the “Your Handbook” regular retirees to pursue 
their benefit claims against Empire.  Instead, the Second 
Circuit ruled that a generalized reservation-of-rights clause 
plus termination language about a specific benefit provided a 
clear message to retirees about the nonvesting nature of their 
benefits. . . .  Finally, the court upheld the motion of the pre-
1987 SPD plaintiffs in Devlin by ruling that there was 
adequate written language in the SPDs “capable of 
reasonably being interpreted as creating a promise’ to 
survive an employer’s summary judgment motion.”  Since the 
pre-1987 SPDs lacked a reservation-of-rights clause, and 
certain other sentences read that “retired employees, after 
[meeting a condition precedent] will be insured” and that life 
insurance benefits “will remain at [the annual salary] level 
for the remainder of their lives,” there were reasonable 
grounds to interpret an intent to vest life insurance benefits. 
. .  [Therefore,] the Empire retirees require[d] either 1) an 
absence of an employer reservation-of-rights clause coupled 
with a specific clause that was sufficiently ambiguous in 
order to proceed. Thus, a generalized reservation-of-rights 
clause, standing alone, is apparently sufficient to sustain an 
employer's motion for summary judgment. 
 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 316-18.  See also Stearns v. NCR Corp., 297 F.3d 706 
(8th Cir. 2002): 
 
[a] group of early retirees brought suit against their former 
employer for reducing health benefits granted to them in 
their severance package.  The plaintiffs accepted an 
Enhanced Retirement Program package in 1993 that 
provided, inter alia, a better health care package than was 
currently offered under the company’s standard medical 
plan.  Six years later, the company instituted sweeping 
changes, including higher premiums, increased deductibles 
and co-payments, and cancellation of the company’s Medicare 
supplement plan.  Plaintiff Stearns represented the retiree 
class, arguing that NCR’s purported reservation-of-rights 
provision in the Plan Amendments subsection of the group 
benefits plan was invalid.  The Eighth Circuit ruled for the 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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employer, citing its precedent from Hughes v.  3M Retiree 
Medical Plan that an unambiguous reservation-of-rights 
provision is sufficient to defeat a claim that retirement 
welfare plan benefits are vested.  Explaining the framework 
of contract analysis, the court said that extrinsic evidence 
could only be considered in cases of facial ambiguity or 
conflict with other plans provisions.  Finding neither 
situation, the Eighth Circuit held that NCR could terminate 
benefits according to the reservation-of-rights clause. 
 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 318.  In Bland v. Fiatallis North America, Inc., 401 
F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2005), there was no reservation-of-rights clause: 
 
The plaintiff-retirees protested their employer’s “onion 
solution” to gradually peel away layers of retiree benefits 
over time, and initiated suit on grounds that the contract 
language was ambiguous and subject to extrinsic evidence of 
an intent to vest.  The Seventh Circuit recognized that 
although health benefits do not vest automatically, they may 
be so triggered by an affirmative contractual promise by the 
employer.  While the court noted that a contract that is silent 
about vesting holds a presumption that the employer did not 
intend to grant vested benefits, this presumption is defeated 
by what Judge Richard Posner called “any positive indication 
of ambiguity, [or] something to make you scratch your head.” 
. . . Ultimately, in the absence of contrary evidence where the 
language was ambiguous, the Seventh Circuit determined 
that “lifetime” within the plan documents was used as a 
durational term that equated to “good for life unless revoked 
or modified.” Accordingly, it reversed the lower court’s 
granting of summary judgment for the employer and 
remanded the case to decide the scope of vested benefits that 
were ostensibly promised by the employer. 
 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 319.  And lastly, in Boubolis v. Transport Workers 
Union of America, 442 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2006), an employee union was the 
benefits-slashing employer.  Plaintiff-retirees, former New York City Transit 
Authority workers, alleged that they were given assurances at various 
junctures during their employment with Local 100, of the Transport Workers 
Union of America that they would have “lifetime health insurance coverage” 
under Local 100’s plan.  When new union leadership of Local 100 terminated 
the health care benefits of all retirees who were otherwise eligible for health 
insurance coverage from another employer, these retirees sued to enforce their 
right to be covered by Local 100’s plan. 
 
The retirees first argued that their health benefits were 
"lifetime" in nature because, although the SPD lacked 
explicit vesting language, it listed only two conditions - 
ceasing employment and death - by which benefits could 
terminate.  Because they were already retired, plaintiffs 
21
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unionized world of Tackett the parties appear to have decided to 
rely on the cost containment device known as cap letters and to 
wait silently and see if either the upward trajectory of health 
care costs and/or the regulatory environment might improve.37 
A cap letter refers to a written summary of caps the 
employer and union agreed would govern maximum employer 
contributions to retiree health costs.  The caps in Tackett were 
explicitly established to comply with FAS 106.  At the 2011 
bench trial, Ron Hoover who worked for the international union, 
testified to the effect that: 
 
[T]he 1991 cap letter as a union compromise to 
help [the employer] control or minimize its 
liabilities; he explained that the letter was a way 
to avoid showing the extent of projected liability 
for retiree medical benefits due to FASB 
considerations.  In other words, Hoover noted, the 
cap letter was a mechanism by which a company 
could minimize cost numbers to attract investors.  
He explained how the letter worked and the 
importance of what he called the “bite date”, or the 
date on which retirees would have to actually 
begin contributions toward their medical 
insurance.  Hoover emphasized the importance of 
always moving the bite date out so that it could 
always be subject to further movement by 
negotiation.38 
 
reasoned that they could lose their benefits only upon death; 
i.e., the end of their lifetime.  Unfortunately for the retirees, 
the Second Circuit rejected this argument based on the 
widely held rule that the absence of vesting language does 
not create a promise to vest by the employer.  The SPD 
therefore did not, on its own, vest lifetime health care 
benefits in the retirees. 
 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 320. 
37. I am indebted to Joe Stuligross, Esq. of the United Steelworkers for 
explaining to me the form and function of cap letters in connection with both 
the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and the management of 
retiree health care cost containment. 
38. Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 742 F. Supp. 2d 901, 904 (S.D. 
Ohio 2010). 
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In addition, Hoover noted that there was a general 
understanding between the employer and the union that the 
“bite date” would always be moved up as “the union never 
intended to have retirees pay a premium and that he understood 
that the company representatives could not say publically that 
there would never be retiree contributions because the 
accountants would then not certify the FASB statements.”39 
Apparently the caps in place always distinguished between 
maximums for retirees over the age of 65 (i.e. those who were 
Medicare40 eligible) and those under 65 who had no other source 
of health insurance. 
In 1994, for example, the cap at Goodyear master agreement 
facilities (which were not part of this litigation) was $11,700 for 
those under 65 and $4,200 for those over 65.41  The Medicare 
 
39. Exhibit A: Excerpt of Ron Hoover Deposition Transcript at 72, Tackett 
v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 742 F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (No. 2:07-
cv-00126-GLF-NMK). 
40. Medicare is the largest health insurance program offered by the 
United States government, serving more than 49 million people.  It is run by 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which is part of the 
U.S.  Department of Health and Human Services.  What is Medicare, 
MYMEDICAREANSWERS.COM, https://www.mymedicareanswers.com/docs/DOC-
1016 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).  Medicare covers Americans 65 and older and 
those who qualify due to a disability.  While being “eligible” means you may 
enroll in Medicare, there are strict rules regarding when you can enroll.  Id.  
At age 65, an individual is eligible for Parts A and B, even if they still work, 
though, some individuals may have to pay premiums for Part A and most have 
to pay premiums for Part B.  Id.  Medicare is divided into four parts: A, B, C, 
and D.  Id.  Parts A and B are considered “Original Medicare.”  Id.  Part A, or 
hospital insurance, helps cover an individual’s care when they are admitted to 
a hospital or skilled nursing facility, which also includes hospice care and home 
healthcare.  The Part and Plans of Medicare, MYMEDICAREANSWERS.COM, 
https://www.mymedicareanswers.com/docs/DOC-1014 (last visited Oct. 7, 
2015).  Part B, or medical insurance, helps cover doctor’s visits and outpatient 
care.  Id.  Part B also assists in paying for some services that Part A does not 
cover, such as physical therapy, some home healthcare, and some preventive 
services.  Id.  Part C, or Medicare Advantage (MA), is not offered by the federal 
government as Parts A and B are, but instead offered by health insurance 
companies.  Id.  Part C covers everything Parts A and B cover and often covers 
other services such as wellness programs.  Id.  Part D, or the Medicare 
Prescription Drug Plan, is provided by insurance companies and other private 
companies, and is an optional prescription drug coverage plan.  Id. 
41. Defendant’s Exhibit 3 at 2, Tackett I  (claiming that beginning on July 
20, 1994, 
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program was clearly an important backdrop to the M & G 
Polymers retiree healthcare benefit.42  For retirees too young for 
Medicare the only likely source of health insurance was the 
employer’s coverage; for those 65 and above the expectation was 
that Medicare would function as the main source of coverage.  
This accounts for the wide variation in cap amounts.  The cap 
letter arrangement also explains the essence of the mysterious 
silence about a crucial aspect of the retiree health benefit-why 
neither party had an incentive to formalize its views about 
vesting and the source of external pressures that encouraged 
 
[t]he average annual Company contributions to be paid for all 
health care benefits per retired employee (including their 
surviving spouse) who retires on or after May 1, 1994, shall 
not exceed $11,700 for retirees (including surviving spouses) 
under age 65 and $4,200 for retirees (including surviving 
spouses) over age 65). 
 
42. Medicare, as has been noted by others, is generally only available to 
those age 65 and older.  For retirees who lose employer sponsored health 
insurance, the only remaining alternative is government-provided or 
government-paid care, such as that available through Medicare and Medicaid 
for certain parts of the population.  But healthy, early retirees historically have 
not qualified for either of the safety net programs.  Except for those with 
serious disabilities or certain terminal conditions, Medicare eligibility begins 
at age sixty-five.  Medicaid eligibility traditionally has required not only that 
a person fit into specified categories—none of which has been likely for 
someone age fifty-five plus who is not disabled—but also that the person be 
impoverished.  Cancelosi, supra note 12, at 765.  Cancelosi also notes: 
 
[o]n the other hand, retirees age sixty-five and older start out 
reasonably well thanks to Medicare’s safety net.  They still 
need and use employment-based coverage, however, because 
gaps in Medicare coverage make the safety net far less solid 
than many realize.  Thus, for example, annual out-of-pocket 
health care spending by Medicare beneficiaries averaged 
$4241 per beneficiary in 2006, with younger beneficiaries 
spending far less on average than older ones.  The vast 
majority of Medicare beneficiaries—eighty-nine percent in 
2007—therefore obtain some form of secondary insurance to 
offset these costs.  About a third have access to such 
insurance through a former employer.  This remained true 
even after the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act (MMA) added Part D prescription drug 
coverage, closing what had been one of the most glaring 
benefit holes. 
 
Id. at 765-66. 
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both the union and the employer to behave in a way that 
presented the best possible picture of the company’s health to 
outsiders. 
 
C. Yard-Man and Sixth Circuit Jurisprudence 
 
The behavior of the parties in Tackett and their mutual 
confidence in the cap letter device can only be fully understood 
in light of the somewhat unique approach the Sixth Circuit had 
taken decades earlier in an effort to deal with labor agreements 
and ancillary contracts that were silent or ambiguous on some 
critical issue.  In its landmark decision in Yard-Man, the appeals 
court, ostensibly relying on ordinary principles of contract law, 
held that an employer whose collective bargaining agreement 
did not specifically address the duration of retiree health 
benefits must have intended those benefits to vest for life.  The 
Yard-Man decision emphasized the role of context and, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Tackett, “[t]he Court of Appeals has 
continued to extend the reasoning of Yard-Man.  Relying on 
Yard-Man’s statement that context considerations outweigh the 
effect of a general termination clause, it has concluded that, 
‘[a]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree 
benefits themselves,’ a general durational clause says nothing 
about the vesting of retiree benefits.”43 
Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, expresses 
unmistakable frustration with Yard-Man and its ostensibly 
contextual approach to discerning the intent of the parties in the 
face of silence about the duration of retiree health benefits.  He 
asserts: “[a]s an initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary 
contract principles by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of 
vested retiree benefits in all collective bargaining agreements.  
 
43. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 935 (2015) (“We 
disagree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment that the inference applied in 
Yard-Man and its progeny represent ordinary principles of contract law.  As 
an initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary contract principles by placing a 
thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective-
bargaining agreements.  That rule has no basis in ordinary principles of 
contract law.  And it distorts the attempt ‘ascertain the intention of the 
parties.’ Yard-Man’s assessment of likely behavior in collective bargaining is 
too speculative and too far removed from the context of any particular contract 
to be useful in discerning the parties’ intention”). 
25
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That rule has no basis in ordinary principles of contract law.”44  
Thomas suggests that Yard-Man consists of one inference after 
another and results in a conclusion that is directly at odds with 
traditional principles. 
 
The Court of Appeals also failed even to consider 
the traditional principle that courts should not 
construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime 
promises. . . . Similarly the Court of Appeals failed 
to consider the traditional principle that 
‘contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary 
course, upon termination of the bargaining 
agreement.’  That principle does not preclude the 
conclusion that the parties intended to vest 
lifetime benefits for retirees.  Indeed, we have 
already recognized that ‘a collective bargaining 
agreement [may] provid[e] in explicit terms that 
certain benefits continue after the agreement’s 
expiration.’  But when a contract is silent as to the 
duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer 
that the parties intended those benefits to vest for 
life.45 
 
Although the trial record is replete with suggestions that 
the ambiguity in Tackett was strategic or “conscious” as 
Professor Duhl has suggested,46 Thomas does not distinguish 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 936-37 (citation omitted). 
46. See Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in the 
Interpretation of Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71 (2009).  In 
Duhl’s article he discusses this intentional ambiguity: 
 
Scholars have previously given attention to the benefits 
(especially economic) of lawyers intentionally drafting open, 
incomplete, and vague contracts, but Cerberus illustrated 
that lawyers also deliberately draft contracts that are 
inconsistent.  Although open, incomplete, and vague terms 
should be encouraged in the drafting of contracts in certain 
circumstances, we should discourage rather than encourage 
ambiguity.  Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott do not believe 
that the goal in contract interpretation is to help courts get 
at the “correct answer,” but rather to get parties to write in 
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between ambiguity that arises from a simple failure of drafting 
and the strategic approach that both M & G Polymers and the 
union both found so useful for so many.  The core question raised 
by Tackett is what is the proper rule of interpretation when both 
parties found it advantageous to leave a critical term out of a 
contract? 
The problem in Tackett is by no means unique to labor 
contracts or employee benefits plans for active or retired 
employees. 
As Judge Posner had observed, even in a setting of perfect 
foresight an interpretive problem may arise.  Parties may 
rationally decide not to provide for a contingency, preferring to 
economize on negotiation costs by delegating completion of the 
contract, should the contingency materialize, to the courts.  This 
is especially true if they think that the likelihood that the 
contingency will materialize is slight.  But even if they think the 
likelihood is significant they may prefer to leave the contingency 
not provided for.  Deliberate ambiguity may be a necessary 
condition of making the contract; the parties may be unable to 
 
“the court’s language.”  But Schwartz and Scott miss the 
mark in not accounting for deliberate ambiguity in 
addressing what is the majoritarian default rule that courts 
should use to interpret contracts that are silent as to “judicial 
interpretive style.”  They suggest that the default should be 
the Willistonian four-corners rule, which bars parties from 
introducing extrinsic evidence to show that the contract is 
ambiguous.  The Willistonian approach enables parties to 
include ambiguous language in contract when it suits their 
interests, at the expense of courts having to make an 
imprecise judgment about whether the contract is 
ambiguous, which risks getting the result wrong. 
. . . . [C]ourts should discourage lawyers from drafting 
intentionally ambiguous contracts in the rush to get a deal 
done.  Part of lawyers’ professional obligation is to draft clear 
contractual language for their clients.  Furthermore, lawyers 
have an ethical obligation to reveal known inconsistencies 
that exist in the agreements that they are drafting, and not 
to contribute to such inconsistencies.  Where the language of 
the agreement is ambiguous, there is a risk—especially from 
application of the four-corners rule—of courts not enforcing 
the obligations to which the parties consented.  This risk 
poses a challenge to consent and other autonomy-based 
theories of contract. 
 
Id. at 76-77 (citations omitted). 
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agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances on 
being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, 
should the need arise.  It is a form of compromise, like “agreeing 
to disagree.”47  Professor Duhl argues that intentionally vague 
contracts are inconsistent with a lawyer’s ethical duty to be 
forthright and to respect the ethical obligation to draft contracts 
clearly—even when the lawyer believes that without ambiguity 
the deal may not get done.48  He urges courts to rely explicitly on 
the “forthright negotiator” principle in order to discourage 
drafters from doing precisely what the parties in Tackett both 
felt obliged to do.49 
It is hard to see how a forthright negotiator could have 
solved the core problem in Yard-Man or in Tackett.  The hard 
reality of retiree health benefits is that they began as a relatively 
inexpensive way to continue health benefits for a small group of 
formerly active employees who needed a bridge to Medicare.50  
 
47. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation 
3 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 229, 2004), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/229-rap-contracts.pdf.  Judge Posner 
proceeds to say: 
 
The goal of a system, methodology, or doctrine for contractual 
interpretation is to minimize contractual transaction costs, 
broadly understood as obstacles to efforts voluntarily to shift 
resources to their most valuable use.  Those costs can be very 
great when by inducing parties not to contract they prevent 
resources from being allocated efficiently.  Because methods 
of reducing contractual transaction costs, such as litigation, 
are themselves costly, careful tradeoffs are required.  But it 
would be a serious mistake for courts to take the position that 
any ambiguity in a contract must be the product of a culpable 
mistake by one or both of the parties; that the judicial 
function in contract law is to punish parties who do not make 
their agreement clear.  Sometimes it is, but more often it is 
not. 
 
Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).  Judge Posner concludes his paper with, “[t]he 
more carefully drafted the contract is, the easier it will be for the parties to 
resolve a dispute over its meaning when the dispute first arises, in other words 
at the prelitigation stage.”  Id. at 42.  Thus, lowering the transactional costs 
that could potentially be incurred. 
48. Duhl, supra note 45, at 115. 
49. See generally Duhl, supra note 45 
50. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 293. 
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Retirees who had spent twenty or thirty years working in heavy 
manufacturing jobs often needed to leave the workforce well 
before the age of 65.  And, if they made it to 65, anything else 
the employer offered functioned as a supplement to Medicare.51 
If the forthright negotiator understands both the pressures 
 
Retiree health benefits originated as an extension of 
employer-provided health insurance for employees, a 
phenomenon that itself began largely as an employer 
response to wage controls imposed by Congress during World 
War II and was later canonized by a tax law provision that 
excluded such insurance from employees’ taxable income.  
The pervasiveness of industrial unions during this period 
further contributed to the expansion of various employer-
provided job benefits, most especially health insurance.  As 
an outgrowth of this phenomenon, employers agreed to 
maintain such health insurance after their workers retired, 
an especially valuable benefit during the period prior to the 
enactment of Medicare.  Employers were generally amenable 
to providing these benefits, because health care costs were 
not expensive, life expectancy was rather limited, and no 
actual expenditures were required until many years into the 
future.  As Americans began living longer in retirement, 
however, these benefits became much more expensive at the 
same time that they became more valuable to covered 
retirees. 
 
Id. at 293-94; see History of Health Insurance Benefits, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
RESEARCH INST. http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=0302fact 
(Mar. 2002) (detailing the history of employer-based health benefits in the 
United States). 
51. Richardson, supra note 2, at 8. “For those with employer sponsored 
retiree health insurance, the cost of coverage varies significantly between the 
pre-65 and the Medicare-eligible populations.  The reason is that employer 
sponsored retiree health insurance is the primary source of coverage for the 
pre-65 group, whereas employer sponsored insurance is the supplemental 
payer for the Medicare eligible population.” Id. 
 
There are two basic designs for retiree health benefit plans: 
one for plans covering retirees under age 65 and one covering 
retirees age 65 and older.  The reason for this age distinction 
is that eligibility for the Medicare program begins at age 65.  
For retirees under age 65, the benefit plan is usually based 
on the coverage they received while working, although, in 
recent years, programs for early retirees have increasingly 
featured different premium sharing than programs for active 
employees. 
 
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at 71. 
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imposed on the employer by FAS 106 and has paid attention to 
the rapidly escalating cost of health insurance, she will recognize 
immediately the advantage of forestalling for as long as possible 
the inevitable.  Whether her client is the union or M & G 
Polymers she will understand that the best possible outcome is 
to push forward the date on which the employer can no longer 
afford to cover the entire cost of retiree healthcare.  If, relying 
on the cap letter device, this result can be postponed for three 
more years, which is an unambiguous win for both parties.  The 
union understands that FAS 106 makes it entirely unreasonable 
to demand explicit language about vesting; the employer 
likewise wants to present the most attractive financial picture 
possible.  The union and the employer both also know that, 
increasingly, the cap amounts are failing to keep up with 
healthcare inflation.  The only end to this story is a bad one.  
These parties aren’t lacking information or suffering from the 
failure of a legal representative who is insufficiently aggressive 
or honest.  What they both lack is the ability to navigate the twin 
demands of increased transparency and rapidly escalating 
health care costs. 
Under these circumstances the Sixth Circuit’s “thumb on 
the scale” in Yard-Man, while inconsistent with basic contract 
principles as Scalia pointed out in oral argument and Thomas 
notes in Tackett, represents an understandable albeit flawed 
approach to an otherwise impossible predicament for the 
parties.  It was entirely reasonable for retirees to assume that 
their benefits were available to them for life at no cost.  The 
entire course of conduct between the parties supported this 
understanding.52  At the same time, representatives of both the 
 
52. From the beginning in 1991 the Company expressed this view: 
 
For purposes of conforming with the new Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) accounting 
requirements and rising health care costs, the Company has 
established a required maximum average annual company 
cost per retiree for medical coverage. 
 
These limits are presently $10,500 per year for each retired 
employee (including surviving spouse) under age 65 and 
$4,200 for each retired employee (including surviving spouse) 
over age 65, with those ages being determined as of January 
1 of each year.  These limits equal the average cost for the 
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over 65 and under 65 age groups.  The limits should not be 
confused with the claim payments for an individual retiree.  
If the average for either group in the future exceeds the 
present averages, then the cost of that excess will be allocated 
among all members of the group evenly.  No retired employee 
or surviving spouse shall be obligated to contribute for their 
health care costs that exceed the above maximum average 
cost limits. 
 
Exhibit 1 at 6, Tackett I.  This was true even during times of negotiation where 
it would have seemed likely that the company would begin requiring retirees 
to pay.  This is shown in a letter dated November 23, 2003: 
 
During 2003 negotiations between M&G Polymers U.S.A. 
LLC (the “Company”) and the United Steelworkers and its 
Local 644L (collectively the “Union”), the Company and the 
Union discussed the costs and burdens associated with 
various benefits, including medical benefits for active 
employees and retirees.  The parties recognize there are 
many challenges associated with maintenance of these 
benefits, which include unique issues resulting from the large 
number of retirees in comparison to the employees actively 
working for the Company.  At the same time, the Union 
emphasized the importance of these benefits for active 
employees, future retirees, and preexisting retirees.  The 
parties during negotiations agreed to certain modifications of 
the health care benefits available to active employees and 
retirees, including modifications in plan design and 
provisions regarding premium cost sharing for these benefits. 
 
The Company and the Union have mutually agreed, during 
the 2003 negotiations, to make the same health care benefits 
as will be provided to active employees available to retirees.  
Except as set forth below, these benefits will be provided to 
active employees available to retirees.  Except as set forth 
below, these benefits will be made available to retirees on the 
same terms and conditions as for active employees, except 
that premium cost sharing charged to retirees will be based 
on the amount by which total cost for all retiree insurances 
(medical, life, etc.) exceed the caps set forth in Letter H dated 
January 1, 2001.  In addition, retirees will not be required to 
make contribution toward the cost of health care benefit 
premiums until January 1, 2006. 
 
Exhibit 8: Letter of Understanding 2003-6—Retiree Health Care Benefits at 6, 
Tackett I.  In addition, letters from May 15, 1991, July 20, 1994, May 9, 1997, 
January 1, 2001, all claim that there will be a cap on health care coverage, but 
all letters claim that “no retired employee or surviving spouse shall be 
obligated to contribute for such excess health care cost.” See Defendants’ 
Exhibit 2 at 8, Tackett I; Defendants’ Exhibit 3 at 2, Tackett I; Defendants’ 
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employer and the employees must have understood the risk 
associated with their strategy of silence and postponement.  One 
day, unless the cost of healthcare dropped dramatically, the 
employer would no longer be able to afford to offer retirees cost 
free health insurance.  The outcome in Tackett is not surprising, 
nor is the high court’s repudiation of Yard-Man which never 
enjoyed much support outside the Sixth Circuit.  The only 
remarkable feature of Tackett is that the parties, relying on 
strategic silence made an essentially unworkable arrangement 
last as long as they did. 
 
III. Alternative Approaches and the Limited Applicability of 
Yard-Man 
 
Much of Justice Thomas’ opinion in Tackett is devoted to 
critiquing the Sixth Circuit’s longstanding precedent for dealing 
with labor contracts that reference benefits provisions but fail to 
speak explicitly to the vesting question.  Thomas may have felt 
empowered to reject Yard-Man in part because so many other 
circuit courts did so first.  The fact is Yard-Man never gained 
much traction outside of the Sixth Circuit, much to the dismay 
of some.53  It is a measure of how widespread the retreat from 
retiree health care has been over the past few decades that every 
single circuit court of appeals has had several occasions upon 
which to evaluate the Yard Man approach.  And, in most 
instances outside of the Sixth Circuit, these courts have declined 
 
Exhibit 4 at 2, Tackett I; Exhibit H at 28, Tackett I. 
53. David L.Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection 
against Employer Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 77, 90 (1987) (“Yard-Man is an obviously significant case, seriously 
dealing with the difficult conceptual analysis of whether benefits are vested 
and interminable, supplemented by the “status” benefit analysis.  This case 
encapsulates the pivotal conceptual inquiry that the courts must conduct in all 
such cases, and helpfully suggests appropriate general guidelines to structure 
this analysis”); Joan Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part: Vesting of Retiree 
Insurance, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 183, 207 (1987) (“Yard-Man . . . stand[s] for the 
proposition that when the language of the agreement is ambiguous and when 
the company’s statements and actions indicate that it did not consider the 
benefits to be limited to the duration of the collective bargaining agreement, 
then courts will treat the benefits as lifetime benefits.  This is a reasonable 
result; in the absence of clear language indicating that benefits last only for 
the duration of the collective bargaining agreement, retirees are likely to 
believe they have lifetime benefits and will plan accordingly.”). 
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to presume that the parties intended for retiree health benefits 
to vest absent clear language to the contrary. 
For example, in Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries54 the 
Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the retirees’ attempt to invoke 
a Yard-Man inference.  “[W]e disagree with Yard-Man to the 
extent that it recognizes an inference of intent to vest.  Congress 
explicitly exempted welfare benefits from ERISA’s vesting 
requirements. . . . Proper allocation of the burden of proof in this 
case leads to the conclusion that the district court correctly held 
that retiree welfare benefits were intended to last only for the 
duration of the CBA [collective bargaining agreement].”55  In the 
Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner authored the majority opinion in 
the well-known case of Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.56  While 
 
54. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(ruling that welfare plans did not vest as a matter of law and that the former 
employees had the burden of proving that the parties intended that the 
duration of benefits was not tied to the agreement that created them.  The 
former employees relied on a faulty summary plan description given to them 
by the former employer.  The court held that the former employees did not 
show significant reliance on the summary sufficient to secure relief.). 
55. Id. at 1517.  (Explaining briefly, but accurately, that, in general, 
ERISA provides fewer protections for welfare plan benefits such as healthcare 
then for pensions).  See, e.g., Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1997) (explaining that Congress 
purposely chose the word “plan” as opposed to “pension plan” as it could have 
easily done to exempt welfare benefits to vest automatically); Curtiss-Wright 
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (claiming that “ERISA does not 
create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or 
any other kind of welfare benefits.  Employers or other plan sponsors are 
generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify or 
terminate welfare plans”); Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“[T]he insurance benefits at issue here are ‘welfare’ benefits, which, 
unlike pension benefits under ERISA, do not automatically vest in the absence 
of an agreement providing for lifetime entitlement.”) (citations omitted); 
Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1993) (“ERISA 
does not require the vesting of health or other ‘welfare’ benefits, as it does 
pension benefits”) (citations omitted). 
56. Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 604-05. . . . The lead opinion specifically adopts: 
 
[t]he weak no-vest rule.  First, it rejects the strong no-vest 
rule (the Senn rule) because its rigidity may frustrate the 
actual intent of the parties, and it is in tension with the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.  The lead opinion 
likewise rejects [the parol substitution rule] because that rule 
would resort to extrinsic evidence even when the agreement 
is silent about retiree benefits, thus ‘depriving parties of the 
protection of a written contract.’  Having rejected both of 
33
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declining to follow the Sixth Circuit’s inference in Yard-Man the 
court noted that a contract can “create[] entitlements that 
outlast it.”57  Specifically, 
 
these ‘extreme’ options, the lead opinion falls back on the one 
remaining option, the weak no-vest rule, and finds that it 
comports with settled principles of contract law. 
 
Id. at 611 (citation omitted). 
57. Id. at 606.  The court goes on to state: 
 
At argument the plaintiffs’ counsel gave the example of 
wages due under a contract of employment at will, a contract 
terminable at the whim of either party.  Suppose the 
employer’s practice is to pay employees at the end of each 
week for the work they have done during the week.  Jones, 
an employee at will, is fired at noon on Wednesday, having 
worked 20 hours that week.  The contract is at an end as of 
noon that day, and yet, quite apart from any statutory 
entitlement that employees may have to be paid at the agreed 
rate for work actually done (Nat’l. Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 
784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.  1986)), the employee would have a 
compelling argument that the employer’s promise to pay for 
work actually done had survived the expiration of the 
contract.  This is not the best example for the plaintiffs’ point, 
however, because an alternative conceptualization of 
employment at will treats it as a unilateral contract that is 
accepted by the employee’s working at the agreed wage.  1A 
Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 152 at 13-14 
(1963).  So understood, a contract of employment at will does 
not end until the employee is paid.  But there are plenty of 
better examples—examples of bilateral contracts that create 
obligations that outlive the term of the contract because the 
parties wanted them to do so.  A contract that contains a post-
employment restrictive covenant is one, Tower Oil & Tech. 
Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060 (1981); J.D. Marshall Int’l, 
Inc. v. Fradkin, 409 N.E.2d 4, 42 (1980), and there are others. 
Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991); 
Ryan v. Chromalloy American Corp., 877 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 
1988); In re White Farm Equipment Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1193 
(6th Cir. 1986).  No doubt a court should cast a cold eye on 
contentions that a contract with a fixed term actually created 
a perpetual obligation, William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-
Tomah Broadcasting Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1983), 
and should, therefore, as Senn and many other cases hold 
(notably Litton), presume that a collective bargaining 
agreement ceases to obligate the employer when the 
agreement’s term (invariably three years) is up.  But it is not 
an irrebuttable presumption.  “Rights which accrued or 
vested under the [collective bargaining] agreement will, as a 
general rule, survive termination of the agreement.” Litton 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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[E]mployers adamant against assuming 
perpetual obligations can eliminate all doubt by 
insisting on a clause that makes any entitlement 
to health benefits granted by the agreement 
expire on the date the agreement expires.  
Employers don’t even have to bargain over health 
benefits of retired employees.  They certainly don’t 
have to grant such benefits in perpetuo.  If they 
did so in the past, not anticipating the recent rise 
in health care costs, they should not expect the 
courts to bail them out by undoing the 
contractually determined allocation of risk on the 
question.58 
 
In the First Circuit, a reservation of rights (ROR) clause was 
sufficient to defeat employee claims that a collection of welfare 
plan benefits had vested.59  Although the plaintiffs raised Yard-
 
Fin. Printing Div. v.  NLRB, 501 U.S  at 207.  The question is 
what it takes to rebut the presumption. We add that the 
obligation for which the plaintiffs contend in this suit is not 
perpetual, because retired people and their widows (or 
widowers) do not live forever. 
 
Id. at 606-07. 
58. Id. at 609 (citation omitted). 
 
Employers don’t even have to bargain over health benefits of 
retired employees.  They certainly don’t have to grant such 
benefits in perpetuo.  If they did so in the past, not 
anticipating the recent rise in health costs, they should not 
expect the courts to bail them out by undoing the 
contractually determined allocation of risk on the question.  
Courts do not sit to relieve contract parties of their 
improvident commitments, except within the limited 
dispensation conferred by the doctrine of impossibility, not 
here invoked.  Contracting parties who want to be spared the 
uncertainties of trial by jury have only themselves to blame 
if by failing to specify the limits of their undertakings they 
open the door to extrinsic evidence of contractual meaning. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
59. Senior v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas Co., 449 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2006).  The 
court claims 
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Man and encouraged the First Circuit to adopt it, Judge Lynch 
noted, “[o]ur view is that in a claim for benefits based on a labor 
agreement under the LMRA federal labor law creates no 
presumption regarding vesting.”60  Likewise, the Second Circuit 
declined to adopt the Yard-Man inference.  In Schonholz v. Long 
Island Jewish Medical Center,61 the court noted that a party 
 
[i]f  the intent of the bargain contained in the ERP 
agreements was to remove  the reservation of rights the 
company had always retained and to advantage plaintiffs 
over all other employees, one would expect the agreement, or 
some other relevant document, to say so.  As we discuss, the 
bargaining history shows nothing of the sort. 
 
Id. at 222. The court concludes that, after applying normal principles of 
contract interpretation and labor agreements, the health benefit summaries 
referenced the dental plan documents, which contained the reservation of 
rights language, and say these plan documents are governing. Id. 
60. Id. at 218.  Judge Lynch goes on to list many reasons the court refuses 
to adopt any presumptions in favor of vesting: 
 
We fear that the use of presumptions may interfere with the 
correct interpretation, under normal LMRA rules, of the 
understanding reach by the parties.  Secondly, the use of 
presumptions may also be inconsistent with the dynamics of 
bargaining set up under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169, and the LMRA. Third, Congress could 
easily have created interpretive presumptions by statute had 
it cared to do so.  The text of the LMRA does not contain any 
statutory presumptions.  Fourth, though the courts 
sometimes create judicial interpretive presumptions, there is 
no reason to craft judicial default rules here.  See Bidlack v. 
Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 604 (7th Cir. 1993) (en 
banc).  The Supreme Court has crafted only one presumption 
under the LMRA: the presumption in favor of arbitrability in 
labor contracts, which applies when a CBA contains an 
arbitration clause.  See Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l 
Union v. Nonotuck Res. Assocs. Inc., 64 F.3d 735, 738 (1st 
Cir. 1995). . . . Fifth, in the end, the question will usually be 
one of the degree of clarity that benefits were or were not 
unalterably vested, and if vested, under what conditions.  
There are traditional rules of interpretation of labor 
agreements which have proven adequate to answer those 
questions as to non-ERISA benefits, and we do not see why 
those rules would not work when ERISA benefits are at 
stake.  Those are the rules we use. 
 
Id. 
61. Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996).  
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must “point to a written language capable of reasonably being 
interpreted as creating a promise” in order for vesting to occur.62  
The Fifth Circuit63 likewise shied away from Yard-Man. 
Alone among the courts of appeals, the Eleventh Circuit and 
the Fourth Circuit explicitly followed Yard-Man albeit while 
noting that it simply instructs courts to apply ordinary rules of 
contract interpretation.  United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel 
Co.,64 and Keffer v. Porter65  (but see Dewhurst v. Century 
 
The court points to clarification provided by the Supreme Court: 
 
“ERISA . . . follows standard trust law principles in dictating 
only that whatever level of specificity a company ultimately 
chooses, in an amendment procedure or elsewhere, it is 
bound to that level.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 
514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995).  Therefore, any agreement to vest 
Schonholz’s benefits would only have to be memorialized at 
the same level of formality that LIJ chose in promulgating 
the Severance Plan in the first place.  In this case, the alleged 
promise was memorialized not in a formal plan document, 
but in the 1991 memorandum that Match sent to senior 
employees.  We easily conclude that the December 18 and 
December 22 letters are at least as formal as the 1991 
memorandum and that, therefore, the district court erred in 
concluding that Schonholz’s claim is barred because “Match’s 
letter is not a formal plan document.” Schonholz II, 889 F. 
Supp. at 614.  We also disagree with the district court’s 
holding that LIJ’s commitment to vest Schonholz “must be in 
‘precise language denying the right to withdraw benefits.’” Id. 
at 615 (quoting Wise, 986 F.2d at 938).  We do not think, at 
least in this case, that Schonholz is required to point to 
unambiguous language to support her claim.  See Bidlack, 
993 F.2d at 608-09.  It is enough if she can point to written 
language capable of reasonably being interpreted as creating 
a promise on the part of LIJ to vest her severance benefits.  
Because the December 18 letter may be so interpreted by a 
trier of fact, we remand the contractual vesting claim to the 
district court. 
 
Id. at 78. 
62. Id. 
63. See Nichols v. Alcatel USA Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(noting the Yard-Man inferences were never accepted by this court). 
64. USW v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988). 
65. Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that 
“The intended meaning of even the most explicit language can, of course, only 
be understood in light of the context which gave rise to its inclusion.”) (citing 
UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1467, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
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Aluminum Co.)66 stand almost alone outside of the Sixth Circuit 
in support of the Yard-Man inference.  These cases stand in 
sharp contrast with the lengthy list of cases in the Sixth Circuit, 
which followed Yard-Man.67 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of Yard-Man in Tackett 
certainly cannot be said to have unsettled the law to a significant 
degree outside of the Sixth Circuit.  Even in that circuit the 
Court of Appeals had recognized in Sprague v. General Motors68 
that the presence of a ROR clause, which unambiguously 
guaranteed to the employer the right to amend the plan, 
defeated any subsequent claims that healthcare benefits had 
vested.69  The near universal failure of the Yard-Man approach 
to attract adherents outside the Sixth Circuit no doubt made it 
an easy target for the Supreme Court. 
 
IV. Contract Interpretation in Cases in Cases of Mutually 
 
66. Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2011). 
67. See, e.g., Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 549 F.3d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir. 
2008) (noting that Yard-Man creates no presumption that benefits are vested 
for life.); Noe v. Polyone Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 568 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[u]nless a 
company can point to explicit language in the relevant agreement stating that 
“retirement benefits” terminate at a particular date or do not vest, the benefits 
seem to vest as a matter of law.  What we continually disclaim presuming we 
continually seem to presume.”); UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768 
(6th Cir. 1999) (affirming the ongoing validity of Yard-Man); Golden v. Kelsey-
Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Yard-Man is still good law, and 
controls this case.”). 
68. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).  
“Plaintiffs, retired employees of the defendant, General Motors Corporation, 
allege that GM violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.  (“ERISA”), by denying them fully “paid-up” lifetime 
health care benefits.”  Id. at 392.  The main thrust of the plaintiff’s complaint 
was that GM had bound itself to provide salaried retirees and their spouses 
basic health coverage for life, entirely at GM’s expense.  “The right to such 
coverage vested upon retirement, according to the plaintiffs, so the coverage 
could never be changed or revoked.”  Id. at 395.  This complaint arose when 
GM announced in late 1987 that significant changes would be effective in 
health care coverage for both salaried employees and retirees the following 
year.  Id.  Ultimately, the court affirmed the order that the employer was 
entitled to summary judgment on the employees’ claims of breach of plan 
documents because the plan reserved the right to amend the health care 
benefits.  The court itself claims, “[n]either the GM plan itself nor any of the 
various summaries of the plan states or even implies that the plaintiffs’ 
benefits were vested.”  Id. at 402. 
69. See id. 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
  
2016 AFTER TACKETT 355 
Strategic Silence 
 
Given the shaky foundation of Yard-Man upon which the 
Sixth Circuit rested its conclusion in Tackett that union 
members could establish their claim to lifetime, employer paid 
retiree health benefits, the Supreme Court’s forceful conclusion 
that the Yard-Man approach was inconsistent with “ordinary 
principles of contract law”70 is not especially surprising.  
Thomas’ opinion for the entire Court, however, seems to leave no 
room for the possibility that, on remand, the Sixth Circuit could 
possibly conclude that the parties in fact agreed to free health 
care for life.71  Four justices joined in a concurrence, though, that 
suggests this conclusion is possible. 
The concurrence makes four simple points about contract 
interpretation in situations like those in Tackett: first, “the 
intention of the parties, to be gathered from the whole 
instrument, must prevail.”72  This is not especially helpful in 
Tackett given the lack of language dealing directly with vesting 
in the written instruments.  (This, of course, is the predictably 
risky position the union finds itself in following years of 
“strategic silence”).  Second, a court “must examine the entire 
agreement in light of relevant industry-specific ‘customs, 
practices, usages and terminology.’”73  Third, if the parties’ 
 
70. M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 930-933 (2015). 
71. Justice Thomas enters into several reasons why the logic 
underpinning the Yard-Man decision was flawed, and therefore led the Court 
of Appeals to “further compound this error” of relying on Yard-Man when 
deciding Tackett.  Id. at 936.  First, Thomas criticizes the Court of Appeals for 
attempting to ascertain the intent of the parties during collective bargaining 
with likely behavior as “too speculative and too far removed from the context 
of any particular contract to be useful in discerning the parties’ intention.”  Id. 
at 935.  Second, Thomas questions the ability of the Court of Appeals to 
accurately understand the customs and intentions of parties across diverse 
industries, which would be necessary in the collective bargaining process.  Id.  
Third, Thomas states that Yard-Man was not based in “any record evidence,” 
and therefore the inferences it created rest on a “shaky factual foundation.”  Id. 
at 936. Fourth, Yard-Man principles allowed retiree benefits to vest at a point 
in the future violates the basic contractual principle that a contract is designed 
to “encompass the whole agreement of the parties.”  Id.  Finally, Thomas 
criticizes the Appeals Court for misapplying other contractual principles 
because it was “tugged” at by the influences of Yard-Man.  Id. 
72. Id. at 937 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord, 
Williston on Contracts § 30:2 (4th ed. 2012)). 
73. Id. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord, 
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intent is clearly expressed in the contract then that expression 
must control; where, as in Tackett, the contract is ambiguous, “a 
court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intention 
of the parties.”74  (This, as we shall see, may be the Tackett 
plaintiffs’ only hope going forward).  And, fourth, “implied 
terms” from the expired labor agreements may serve as a basis 
for concluding that the parties in fact intended retiree health 
benefits to vest.75  (This fourth point is a clear rejection of the 
employer’s claim that there can be no vesting without “clear and 
express” language demonstrating intent to vest).76  The 
concurrence concludes by noting that this entire inquiry must 
take place without Yard-Man’s “thumb on the scale” but may 
“for example, [focus on] the parties’ bargaining history.”77  This 
is, for the Tackett plaintiffs, the only part of the opinion which 
offers any hope going forward.78  The agreement itself, as noted, 
 
Williston on Contracts § 30:4 (4th ed. 2012)). 
74. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 11 Richard A.  Lord, Williston on 
Contracts § 30:6 (4th ed. 2012)). 
75. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“‘constraints upon the employer after 
the expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement,’ we have observed, 
may be derived from the agreement's ‘explicit terms,’ but they ‘may arise as 
well from . . . implied terms of the expired agreement.’”) (citing Litton Bus. 
Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 203, 207 (1991)). 
76. Id. at 937.  “To effectuate the intent of the parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement, and provide the uniformity needed in national labor 
law, any commitment to vest health-care benefits should be clear and express 
in the language of the agreement.” Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, M&G 
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010).  Later in 
their brief, the employer continues to argue that the “clear statement rule” 
used by the Third and Fifth Circuits is the optimal solution to resolving silence 
in collective bargaining agreements “regarding the duration of retiree health-
care benefits.”  Id. at 10.  Justice Ginsburg flatly refutes these arguments by 
stating, “Contrary to M&G’s assertion, no rule requires “clear and express” 
language in order to show that parties intended health-care benefits to vest.”  
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
77. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).   “If, after 
considering all relevant contractual language in light of industry practices, the 
Court of Appeals concludes that the contract is ambiguous, it may turn to 
extrinsic evidence-for example, the parties’ bargaining history.  The Court of 
Appeals, however, must conduct the foregoing inspection without Yard-Man’s 
‘thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits.’” Id. 
78. A recent case, Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., has shed light on this 
difference of perspective between the majority and concurring opinion in 
Tackett.  The District Court of Kansas rejected the employees’ claim that they 
were promised lifetime benefits by their employer because they failed to 
identify specific vesting language in their summary plan description (“SPD”).  
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is consciously unclear; it is only the long relationship between 
the parties, their shared concern about increasing demands for 
transparency from regulators, and the cap agreements which 
may suggest that union members’ reliance on what was not said 
was both reasonable and worthy of legal recognition. 
 
A. ERISA’s Equitable Estoppel Jurisprudence 
 
Tackett is certainly not the first instance in which the 
administration of an ERISA plan79 has given rise to claims from 
employees that written or oral communications, combined with 
a long relationship and course of conduct between the parties, 
 
The District Court required express vesting language, stating “. . . the fact that 
these SPDs do not contain an express reservation of rights clause stating that 
the plans cannot be amended or terminated does not indicate unalterable 
lifetime benefits for plan participants.”  Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., 938 F. 
Supp. 2d 1090, 1110-11 (D. Kan. 2013).  The Tenth Circuit affirmed this 
decision in February 2015, one month after the Tackett decision.  Fulghum v. 
Embarq Corp., 778 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2015).  However, the employees’ 
petition for certiorari relies on the principles of contract interpretation, 
claiming that the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on the “clear and express language 
rule represents the same error the Sixth Circuit made in Yard-Man, just in the 
other direction.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Fulgham v. Embarq 
Corp., 778 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2015).  The petitioners argue that the Tenth 
Circuit’s rule is inferring that “no employer could possibly intend to vest health 
care benefits through ambiguous language” even if the relationship of the 
parties, industry custom, or extraneous circumstances were present (emphasis 
in original).  Id. at 27.  This stands in contrast to Justice Ginsberg’s 
concurrence, which clearly states “no rule requires ‘clear and express language’ 
in order to show that parties intended health-care benefits to vest.”  Tackett, 
135 S. Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
79. ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (West 2015).  Within its 
provisions, it also specifies the requirements of coverage for employers when 
they provide retiree benefits.  Id. § 1321 (West 2015).  Congress determined 
that retirement benefits were an important factor “affecting the stability of 
employment and the successful development of industrial relations,” and that 
the protection of interstate commerce requires workers to have “minimum 
standards” to “assur[e] the equitable character” of employer plans nationwide.  
Id. § 1001 (West 2015).  Congress declared this plan necessary to efficiently 
allow the flow of workers throughout interstate commerce.  Id.  ERISA has also 
been interpreted to provide the sole mechanism for asserting improper 
processing of benefits paid to retirees required by ERISA.  Singh v. Prudential 
Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 289-90 (4th Cir. 2003).  ERISA has 
quickly become a nationwide standard for providing civil enforcement for a 
retiree if they have been denied their benefits.  Thus, the civil enforcement 
provisions of ERISA are essential to both establishing and asserting the rights 
of retirees to their benefits.  29 U.S.C. § 1132 (West 2015). 
41
  
358 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
created vested rights that are not clearly expressed in the 
written contract.80  Indeed, there is a substantial ERISA 
jurisprudence that attempts to apply common law principles of 
equitable estoppel to cases involving disputes about plan 
administration and interpretation.81 
 
80. In addition to the numerous cases cited within this paper, several 
other cases have involved both oral and written promises where a 
misunderstanding between the parties or a change in the actual benefits 
provided occurred.  Oral Promise(s) that led to litigation: Ladoucer v. Credit 
Lyonnais, 584 F.3d 510 (2d Cir. 2009); Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 
2002); Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1992); Cefalu v. B.F. 
Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989); Straub v. Western Union Tele. 
Co., 851 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1988); Bingham v. CNA Financial Corp., 408 F. 
Supp. 2d 563 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Sandler v. Marconi Circuit Tech. Corp., 814 F. 
Supp. 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Moeller v. Bertrang, 801 F. Supp. 291 (D.S.D. 
1992); Integrated Health Servs. at Brentwood, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison, 
No. 98 C 0558, 1999 WL 1256255 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1999).  Written 
Promise(s) that led to litigation: Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623 (7th 
Cir. 2004); Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 
2001); Frahm v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 137 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Am. Fed. Grain Millers v. Int’l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 23 F.3d 855 (4th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Taylor 
Insulation Co., 39 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 1994); Adams v. Tetley USA, Inc., 363 F. 
Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2005); Nester v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 162 F. 
Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 
81. First Circuit: Zipperer v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 493 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 
2007) (employee received an estimate that was much higher that the 
retirement benefits he actually received.  Since the information provided to the 
employer was inaccurate, the claim was preempted by ERISA to prevent 
alternate enforcement mechanisms under Massachusetts state law); Todisco v. 
Verizon Comm., Inc., 497 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (plaintiff employee filed a 
complaint against employer for representations made over a telephone hotline 
for employees who had questions about the employee benefit program.  
Plaintiff’s husband was told that he could increase his level of coverage without 
filing out additional statements about his current health, but the clear 
language of the employer’s policy did not allow for this alteration; thus, 
equitable estoppel claim denied); Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan, 239 
F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001) (employee quit working for Raytheon and then rehired, 
but argued he turned down a more lucrative job with a rival company because 
he believed that his previous years of service would be accounted for under the 
new more inclusive benefits program instituted by Raytheon.  Equitable 
estoppel denied because Raytheon had clear language indicating that this was 
not the case).  Second Circuit: Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(employee claimed he relied on an oral promise by the Employer, but such oral 
promises are unenforceable under ERISA); Aramony v. United Way 
Replacement Benefit, 191 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (employee was involved in 
felonious misconduct which violated a clause in the employee benefits 
agreement, so United Way refused to pay his retirement benefits.  Court held 
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that the employee failed to establish extraordinary circumstances regarding 
promises made about these benefits); Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. 
Ctr., 87 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (establishing that an ERISA promissory estoppel 
claim must rest upon the basic principles of contract law and requires the 
plaintiff to establish 1) a promise, 2) reliance on the promise, 3) injury caused 
in reliance, and 4) injustice if the promise is not enforced).  Third Circuit: 
Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 539 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2008) (employee 
was able to establish equitable estoppel because both his DuPont manager and 
supervisor encouraged him to transfer from Conoco to DuPont for lower salary 
for assurances that his years at Conoco would be factored into his pension 
calculation); Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(employee’s estoppel claim failed because they were unable to establish that 
extraordinary circumstances existed, such as the company designing a pension 
plan to deliberately profit from these misrepresentations); Curcio v. John 
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiff 
was entitled to equitable estoppel because John Hancock misrepresented that 
they would cover the expensive treatments of her deceased husband, but then 
disclaimed them after discovering they were related to a hospital error).  
Fourth Circuit: McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(equitable estoppel was a valid claim when the insurer continued accepting 
checks for the employee’s daughter despite her aging out of the plan and also 
never indicating to the contrary until the participant’s murder and benefits 
were due); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(finding that the written language of a policy preempted an estoppel claim 
despite the insurer’s initial claim that all medical care charges would be 
covered).  Fifth Circuit: Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(employee claimed that multiple sources within human resources assured him 
that he would be entitled to a higher amount of benefits provided that he 
appealed further up the corporation.  However, the court held that the reliance 
on such a statement could not be reasonable); Rodrigue v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 
948 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1991) (court reiterates that equitable estoppel is only 
relevant to written promises, not oral promises as indicated by the plaintiffs).  
Sixth Circuit: Bloemaker v. Laborers’ Local 265 Pension Fund, 605 F.3d 436 
(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th 
Cir. 1991)) (explaining that allowing third party representations cannot be 
considered more powerful than written instruments without extraordinary 
circumstances because it would prejudice retirement income of employees); 
Trs. of Michigan Laborers’ Health Care Fund v. Gibbons, 209 F.3d 587 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (providing an excellent analysis of the five equitable estoppel factors 
necessary for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim of equitable estoppel); Sprague 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that GM’s 
representations could not have been applied with the necessary “factual 
precision” to qualify for relief on equitable estoppel).  Seventh Circuit: 
Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing 
that a Wal-Mart employee who had been rehired did not receive an adequate 
explanation of how COBRA benefits would bridge the gap for her coverage, and 
thus, estoppel was an appropriate claim); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 112 
F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1997) (Blue Cross represented that its employee should not 
sue during the appropriate time period, and then used the lack of plaintiff’s 
action as a defense); Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that “where there is no danger that others associated with the Plan 
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One possible avenue of redress for retirees hoping to hold 
onto their health benefits is an estoppel claim based upon the 
federal common law that has developed in connection with 
ERISA welfare and pension plans.82  As others have noted, 
 
can be hurt, there is no good reason to breach the general rule that 
misrepresentations can give rise to estoppel.”).  Eight Circuit: Jensen v. 
SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing that SIPCO modifying its 
retiree benefit plan, providing notice, and then not responding to inquiries 
from employees was not grounds for an estoppel claim under ERISA); Slice v. 
Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that “extra-
contractual promise[s]” were not covered under ERISA equitable estoppel 
claims).  Ninth Circuit: Spink v. Lockheed Corp., 125 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 
1997) (Spink had cited facts that satisfied material misrepresentation because 
Lockheed represented that his pension would transfer from his prior employer 
if he chose to accept employment with Lockheed, but then did not honor those 
promises); Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(finding that the distinction between pre-ERISA and post-ERISA promises was 
irrelevant to this class due to a mixed composition of these promises between 
the workers); Greany v. W. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 821 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (establishing that the 9th Circuit also requires two prerequisites to 
the normal requirements for an ERISA equitable estoppel claim:  1) “the 
provisions of the plan at issue must be ambiguous such that reasonable persons 
could disagree about their meaning or effect,” and 2) “representations [must 
be] made to the employee involving an oral interpretation of the plan.”).  Tenth 
Circuit: Cannon v. Group Health Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(describing that the ambiguity present was the result of different 
interpretations of the written Plan, not misrepresentations or intentional 
ambiguity).  Eleventh Circuit: Glass v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 33 
F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283 (11th 
Cir. 1990)) (holding that “the Eleventh Circuit [has] created a very narrow 
common law doctrine under ERISA for equitable estoppel”).  Additionally, the 
mismanagement of the employer of records that related to eligibility of the 
employee does not provide grounds for an equitable estoppel claim against the 
insurance company providing the benefits.  See also Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, 
Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants’ Rights by Expanding the Federal 
Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.  671 (1994) (arguing that the federal 
common law providing for equitable estoppel claims under ERISA provides the 
greatest likelihood of success for employees who have been wronged by their 
employers and have suffered harm as a result); Adam S. McGonigle, Note, 
Applying Equitable Estoppel to ERISA Pension Benefit Claims, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 627 (2012) (arguing for a broader interpretation of “gross negligence” 
and giving more credence to the reasonable reliance an employee may have 
with her own employer). 
82. The reason for high burden of proof is that ERISA plan sponsors are 
typically “free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify or 
terminate welfare plans.” Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 
78 (1995).  In Curtis-Wright, the employer, Curtis-Wright, issued a Summary 
Plan Description (“SPD”) that informed its employees that coverage under 
their health plan would “cease for retirees and their dependents upon the 
termination of business operations of the facility from which they retired.” Id. 
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retirees have met with limited success as they have struggled to 
prove material misrepresentation by employers in connection 
with changes to health care plans.83  For example, in Moore v. 
Metropolitan Life84 the Second Circuit emphasized the centrality 
of plan documents in these kinds of disputes.85  As Kaplan86 and 
his co-authors have noted, the Moore court pointed out that 
“absent a showing tantamount to proof of fraud, an ERISA 
welfare plan is not subject to amendment as a result of informal 
 
at 75.  Shortly after this SPD was issued, Curtis-Wright closed a plant in New 
Jersey.  Id. at 76.  Curtis-Wright maintained that this SPD was a proper 
amendment of the retirement benefit process based upon language in the 
original Plan documents that allowed Curtis-Wright the ability to “reserve[] 
the right at any time and from time to time to modify or amend . . . any or all 
provisions of the Plan.” Id.  The Supreme Court held that the reservation 
clause “sets forth a valid amendment procedure,” and ERISA is not designed 
to facilitate a specific method by which this method is proper.  Id. at 84-85.  
Given the validity of these reservation clauses, employees must show a 
material misrepresentation by the employer, reasonable and detrimental 
reliance, and extraordinary circumstances.  Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 236-38 (3d Cir. 1994).  As the majority of decisions cited 
above, the burden is substantial for the employees, and often times the written 
agreement drafted by the employer is held as the binding document.  See supra 
notes 73 & 75 and accompanying text. 
83. Vallone, 375 F. 3d at 639-40 (finding that the employees had not 
shown a knowing misrepresentation of fact because the employer could have 
had no actual intent of terminating the retirement benefit when it was offered, 
and second, that the employees unreasonably ignored the reservation of rights 
clauses in the retirement plan documents that “put them on notice that the 
HCA benefit could be terminated or modified”); Hughes Aircraft v. Jacobson, 
525 U.S. 432 (1999) (finding that misrepresentation of benefits to the employee 
may be incidental and thus legitimate); Pisciotta, 91 F.3d at 1331 (reiterating 
that the Ninth Circuit has two additional requirements for an ERISA 
beneficiary to establish material misrepresentation from an employer: 1) the 
provisions of the plan at issue must be ambiguous such that a reasonable 
person could disagree as to their meaning or effect, and 2) oral representations 
must be made to the employee involving an oral interpretation of the plan); In 
re Unisys Corp., 58 F.3d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the employees 
could not establish “reasonable detrimental reliance” on the employer’s 
claims); Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that “absent a showing tantamount to proof of fraud, an ERISA welfare plan 
is not subject to amendment as a result of informal communications between 
an employer and plan beneficiaries”). 
84. 856 F.2d. 488 (2d Cir. 1988).  “Congress intended that plan documents 
and the [Summary Plan Descriptions] exclusively govern an employer’s 
obligations under ERISA plans.” Id. at 492. 
85. See id. 
86. Kaplan, supra note 5. 
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communications between an employer and plan beneficiaries.”87 
In addition, meeting the burden of proof with respect to 
detrimental reliance and extraordinary circumstances 
frequently proves difficult albeit not impossible.  In a rare 
example of success, an employee demonstrated extraordinary 
circumstances to the satisfaction of the Third Circuit in Smith v.  
Hartford Ins.  Group.88  Smith concerned an employee whose 
wife suffered a cerebral hemorrhage which required skilled 
nursing care and treatment.89  During this time the employer 
switched to a self-funded plan that limited skilled care to 180 
days.90  However, the employer repeatedly assured the employee 
that the benefits under the new plan were identical to those of 
the previous plan.91  The court noted that a genuine issue of 
material fact prevented summary judgment as the employer’s 
oral and written communications were ambiguous and that, 
taken together, the employee had satisfied the requirement for 
demonstrating “extraordinary circumstances.”92 
With respect to allegedly oral modifications to plan terms 
the circuit courts are nearly unanimous in their refusal to permit 
oral promises to trump written plan language.93  For retirees 
 
87. Id. at 328 (citing Moore, 856 F.2d at 492). 
88. Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that summary judgment against the plaintiff’s estoppel claim was 
inappropriate due to the repeated oral and written misrepresentations by the 
defendant, the plaintiff’s diligent attempts to obtain answers about coverage, 
and the large costs of the care). 
89. Id. at 133. 
90. Id. at 133-34. 
91. Id. at 134. 
92. Id. at 142. See Bloemker v. Laborers Local 265 Pension Fund, 605 F.3d 
436 (6th Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs, an ERISA plan participant and his wife, sued 
defendants alleging that the plan breached an agreement with him, that he 
detrimentally relied on defendants’ misrepresentations and that they also 
breached fiduciary duties owed to him under the plan.  The Court concluded 
that extraordinary circumstances existed where the plan administrator 
certified erroneous early retirement pension amounts as correct and paid the 
incorrect amount for 22 months); see also Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2001) (remanding the estoppel claim back to 
the District Court to determine if the employer held the retirement programs 
out as an incentive to retire, if it had then this would be considered 
extraordinary circumstances). 
93. See, e.g., Ladouceur v. Credit Lyonnais, 584 F.3d 510 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(citing the language of Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215, 225 (2d Cir. 2002)); 
Perreca, 295 F.3d at 215 (holding that oral promises made by an employer are 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1
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such as those in Tackett, this generally difficult legal standard, 
combined with the absence of the Yard-Man inference, means 
written contracts and ancillary documents will surely control the 
outcome of retiree health litigation. 
 
B. Lifetime Benefits Not Uncommon 
 
One of the curious features of the Tackett arrangement-a 
long term practice of providing retiree health benefits for life in 
the absence of explicit language enshrining the practice-is that 
a review of recent Sixth Circuit cases makes it clear that what 
would seem unthinkable now for economic reasons94 was 
apparently quite common in many heavy manufacturing 
industries up until recently.  For example, shortly after the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Tackett, Whirlpool Corp. 
very publicly moved to reverse an adverse ruling in the Sixth 
 
“unenforceable under ERISA and therefore cannot vary the terms of the 
employer’s pension plan” (citing Smith v.  Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 7, 
10 (2d Cir. 1992)); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 
2000) (reiterating that the Court has repeatedly stressed that equitable 
estoppel “cannot dilute the rule forbidding oral modifications to an ERISA 
plan”); Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 137 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 
1998) (discussing that oral promises combined with a written plan could lead 
to a worker getting twice the benefits as established, something contrary to 
ERISA interpretation and contract law); Slice v. Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630 
(8th Cir. 1994) (finding that failure to notify the employee of a rollover option 
for his benefits constituted extra-contractual damages and was non 
recoverable under ERISA); Dunham-Bush ,Inc., 959 F.2d at 6 (describing how 
the employee conceded that the oral promise was unenforceable under ERISA); 
de Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plan 
itself is the defining source of a plaintiff’s claim, not material representations 
that items such as plan summaries might include). 
94. It is probably impossible to overstate the role of economic forces in 
these retiree health cases.  From the mid-1980s onward, as the cost of health 
care escalated and the pressure to account for post-employment benefits 
increased, both the bargaining process itself and the administration and 
structure of these expensive ERISA plans were affected in a singular manner 
by costs.  As Joe Stuligross of the United Steelworkers noted, all of these cases 
including Tackett really boil down to an “offer and ask” problem.  He described 
the years leading up to the litigation as “a problem [the cost of retiree health] 
that neither side really wants to talk about.” Telephone Interview with Joe 
Stuligross, United Steelworkers (May 7, 2015) (on file with author).  He pointed 
out that both the “employer and union clearly understood that this benefit was 
for life . . . even when employees went on strike retirees continued to get their 
free healthcare.  This was clearly the intent and the plan was to control for 
costs via the cap letters.” Id. 
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Circuit on facts almost identical to those in Tackett.  The Sixth 
Circuit, in Zino v. Whirlpool Corp.95 had concluded that 
Whirlpool owed a group of retirees lifetime health care 
benefits.96  The Sixth Circuit determined that this was clearly 
the intent of the parties97 and that the absence of clear and 
 
95. Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d 561 (N.D. Ohio 2014). 
96. The District Circuit provides a brief summary of the facts of the case, 
but directs the reader to the summary judgment action brought by cross-
motions from both parties.  Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 5:11CV01676, 2013 
WL 4544518 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2013).  The retirees in this case were ones 
that retired between 1980 and 2007 and were represented by the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 1985 (“the Union”).  Id. at *1.  
Since 1971, the Union and Whirlpool entered into a series of CBAs in “two-, 
three-, or five-year intervals.” Id.  Prior to 1992, “each Welfare Plan explicitly 
provided that company-sponsored healthcare benefits will end upon 
retirement” and that the retirees “may continue medical coverage ‘at their own 
expense.’” Id.  In 1992, “a new Welfare Plan. . . . extended qualifying retiring 
employees the ‘opportunity’ to receive company-paid healthcare after 
retirement.” Id.  Every subsequent Welfare Plan until 2007 recognized this 
opportunity.  Every retiree in the Zino lawsuit “has continued to receive 
company-sponsored healthcare benefits.” Id.  Changes in corporate structure 
occurred during the negotiation of these CBAs, with many of the now Whirlpool 
retirees originally working for Hoover, but Whirlpool sold Hoover to a Hong 
Kong company, keeping the liabilities for the employee retirement plans as a 
part of the deal.  Id. at *2.  In 2011, Whirlpool informed the retirees that it 
would reduce their health care benefits in January 2013, and later extended it 
to January 2014.  Id.  “Specifically, Whirlpool notified Medicare-eligible 
retirees that company-paid supplemental health benefits will . . . have to be 
individually purchased from private insurance companies.  Whirlpool also 
informed Retirees who were not Medicare-eligible that their health coverage 
will ‘transition’ to the same plan as that provided to the majority of Whirlpool 
retirees who are not eligible for Medicare.” Id.  With these planned reductions 
in coverage, “Whirlpool declared ’the right, at its discretion, to change or 
terminate all or any part of the benefits offered at any time and in any 
manner.’” Id.  “Whirlpool does not dispute that [these] reductions . . . [will 
result] in an approximately 75% decrease in estimated present value” of the 
retiree’s benefit plans.  Id. 
97. Zino, 47 F. Supp. 3d  at 583-84.  According to the provision of the 1992 
agreement, the eligibility of retirees “to receive company-paid health benefits 
was unequivocally tied to their receipt of pension benefits.  In order to continue 
company insurance coverage during retirement, these Retirees must have 
retired ‘under the terms of the Pension Plan’ and have had ‘at least ten years 
of pension credit accumulated after attaining the age of 45 (or [have been] born 
prior to December 31, 1937)[.]’” Id. at 569.  The Court relies on Yard-Man 
principles to emphasize that “[u]nder the Sixth Circuit vesting rules, this . . . 
demonstrat[es] the parties’ intent to create vested healthcare benefits.” Id.  
Testimony of various parties also indicated that, “‘the intent’ of the Company 
and the Union was to negotiate an agreement that provided health benefits to 
Retirees for life.” Id. at 571 (emphasis in original).  Finally, the Court focuses 
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express language did not forestall this conclusion.98 
Likewise in USW v. Kelsey-Hayes,99 a case in which the 
employer Kelsey-Hayes (later TRW) sent a letter to employees 
informing them that it would discontinue group health care 
coverage and instead provide Health Reimbursement Accounts 
(HRAs),100 the same court noted that this change was essentially 
a mechanism by which risk shifted from the employer to the 
employees. 
 
The HRAs differed from the prior group coverages 
in that they shifted risk—and potentially costs—
off of the defendants and on to plaintiffs.  At the 
deposition of TRW Benefit Director Shelly 
Iacobelli it was established that, under the HRAs, 
plaintiffs ‘bear[] the risk of expenses that exceed 
the company contribution[.]’  For example, as 
Iacobelli confirmed, if a retiree spent $20,000 in 
2012, the retiree would be responsible for the 
$5,000 spent in excess of the $15,000 in his or her 
 
on the fact that these benefits would continue after the expiration of the CBA, 
which both Yard-Man and Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc.  support.  Id. at 578 
(“the fact that retirees’ insurance benefits initially were continued after the 
collective bargaining agreements expired … would be some evidence of the 
parties’ intent”) (citing Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 676 n.6 (6th 
Cir. 1985)).  See UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1481 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(“[company’s] own course of conduct in continuing retiree insurance benefits 
after plant closure beyond the point as which insurance benefits could have 
been terminated for active employees indicates that it did not consider retiree 
benefits to be tied to the durational limitations of that active group”). 
98. Id. at 4. 
99. USW v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 750 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2014). 
100. In 2012, Kelsey-Hayes switched its group coverage plans to “Health 
Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs).  Id. at 550.  “The HRAs were designed to 
function, essentially as a health care voucher system” that TRW (the company 
at the time) would make “‘a one-time contribution’” of “$15,000 for each eligible 
retiree and his or her spouse.” Id.  Then, as of 2013, “TRW would provide a 
$4,800 credit into the HRAs . . . for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse . . 
. The notion was that [employees] would then use these funds to purchase their 
own insurance from among a variety of providers.” Id.  The benefit of this 
system was to “shift[] risk—and potentially costs—off of [TRW] and onto the 
[employees].” Id.  The benefit of this fixed system of payments was that the 
employer would not be responsible for health care costs that went above the 
fixed cost that went above the one time payment.  Id.  Additionally, TRW would 
be able to predict and fix its costs related to these retiree benefits.  Id. 
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HRA.101 
 
Noting that it found the employer’s assertion that the HRAs 
would provide better coverage than the prior group coverage 
“dubious”102 the Court noted that HRAs are simply not what the 
parties bargained for.103  The Sixth Circuit noted, “we conclude 
that the [collective bargaining agreements] established a vested 
right to lifetime health care benefits, and that the unilateral 
implementation of the HRAs breached [those contracts].”104 
The prevalence of lifetime benefits in unionized, 
manufacturing sectors of the economy 105 would seem to support 
the main contention of the plaintiffs in Tackett: that the benefits 
were so pervasive and so deeply ingrained that, combined with 
past practice and the growing need to be careful about the 
requirements of FAS 106, the lack of explicit language about 
vesting is understandable.  These facts, taken in light of the four 
factors identified by the justices who signed onto the concurring 
opinion in Tackett, are essentially all that the plaintiffs can point 
to in support of their position.  The explicit reliance though in 
 
101. Id. at 550.  This statement was made by the TRW Benefit Director, 
and she admitted that this process shifted excess costs of healthcare to the 
retirees, “as ‘that risk used to be borne by the insurance company’ under prior 
group coverages.” Id. 
102. Id. at 557. 
103. “As described above, the HRAs were simply not what was collectively 
bargained.  The parties agreed in the CBAs that the retirees would get the 
same type of coverage they had upon retirement, which in the case of these 
retirees was group coverages with the full premium paid by the company.” Id. 
104. Id. at 556.  Note that Judge Merritt, concurring, pointed out that this 
case is not about requiring the employer to provide health care benefits in the 
same way forever; instead it is about an “employer [that] clearly violated its 
legal obligations and should be required to pay the price of its recalcitrance.” 
Id. at 561 (Merritt, J., concurring). 
105. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. NO. 
2589, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE 
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005 (2007) (These tables provide various 
breakdowns of benefit plans for various types of employees in the private sector 
across different types of employment, including white collar and blue collar 
workers); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
SUMMARY NO. 08-03, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 (2008) (Table 
16 provides breakdowns of Post Retirement survivorship benefits of 
government employees for various years of service and various levels of 
coverage). 
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both the Whirlpool and Kelsey-Hayes cases on the now 
disfavored Yard-Man inference will make it difficult to overcome 
the new skepticism about vested retiree health care benefits 
after Tackett.106 
C. Regulatory Distortion and FAS 106 
 
The behavior of plan sponsors in the private sector in 
anticipation of and following the implementation of FAS 106 is 
well documented.107  Thousands of employers modified existing 
plans in order to provide for an acceptable balance sheet that 
 
106. Both the Whirlpool and Kelsey-Hayes Courts rely on the Yard-Man 
decision potentially to their detriment.  Yard-Man explained that “retiree 
benefits are in a sense ‘status’ benefits which, as such carry with them an 
inference … that the parties likely intended those benefits to continue as long 
as the beneficiary remains a retiree.” Zino v.  Whirlpool Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d 
561, 566 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting UAW v. Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983)).  However, “Yard-Man is properly 
understood as creating an inference only if the context and other available 
evidence indicate an intent to vest.” Id.  The burden of proof does not shift to 
the employer, and there is no requirement that employers use anti-vesting 
language.  Kelsey-Hayes Co., 750 F.3d at 552 (citing Mauer v. Joy Tech., Inc., 
212 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2000)).  Yard-Man is also influential “for its 
instruction to ‘look to other provisions of the agreement for guidance’ when the 
explicit language is ambiguous as to [the parties’] intent”.  Zino, 47 F. Supp. 
3d at 566 (quoting Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 654 (6th Cir. 
1996)).  Yard-Man and its subsequent cases instruct Courts to simply “apply 
ordinary principles of contract interpretation.”  Kelsey-Hayes, 750 F.3d at 554.  
The Whirlpool Court focuses on the fact that the retirees from the 1980-1983 
have continued to receive their benefits after the CBA expired.  Zino, 47 F. 
Supp. 3d at 566.  This factor leads the Court to believe the Yard-Man 
presumption should act “like a thumb on the scales” for the employees.  Id.  
Similarly, the Court in Kelsey-Hayes cites that Kelsey-Hayes had promised the 
retirees “’the continuance of the healthcare coverages that he or she had … at 
the time of retirement.’”  Kelsey-Hayes, 750 F.3d at 554.  Further, Kelsey-Hayes 
had agreed to pay “the full premium or subscription charge for health care 
coverages continued in accordance” with other sections of the CBA.  Id.  The 
Court found this language unambiguous, and under the Yard-Man 
presumption, there was a vested lifetime right to health care benefits.  Id.  
Indeed, the Yard-Man principles have caused the Sixth Circuit to vacate and 
remand the Kelsey-Hayes case to the District Court.  USW v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 
795 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2015).  However, Judge Merritt dissented with this 
decision, stating that “Kelsey-Hayes employees who are retired are entitled to 
vested health care benefits under the collective bargaining agreements.” Id.  
(Merritt, J., dissenting). 
107. FIN.  ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 106  (1990), 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=12182201236
71&acceptedDisclaimer=true. 
51
  
368 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
would take into account the cost of promises made for future 
payments as required.  Likewise, an argument could be made 
that the changes in the public sector, which were triggered by 
GASB 45,108 were even more dramatic.  Numerous state and 
local government employers have been forced to reckon with the 
size and scope of benefits that had been promised to public 
employees—often without much thought to the future cost to 
taxpayers.109  Indeed, some states are still trying, very publicly, 
to come to terms with the cost of post-employment benefits that 
threaten to crowd out all other spending.110  In the private sector, 
 
108. GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING BY EMPLOYERS FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN 
PENSIONS (2004), 
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=11761
59988899&acceptedDisclaimer=true. 
109. “[P]olitical actors, often in exchange for promises of support at the 
polls, commit to more generous benefits than the taxpayers can realistically 
afford.” Legislators generally realize they have various other commitments in 
addition to pensions, and these “generally require immediate spending in order 
to satisfy the public’s demand for services.” Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case 
for Public Pension Reform: Early Evidence from Kentucky, 47 CREIGHTON L.  
REV. 585, 596 (2014). 
110. Illinois is currently facing a pension crisis that has been exacerbated 
by the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that the attempted 
pension reforms violated the Pension Protection Clause of the Illinois State 
Constitution.  In re Pension Reform Litigation, 32 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2015).  
However, State officials have claimed that extreme measures are necessary to 
curtail the long period of spending and excessive promises made to government 
workers.  Monica Davey, Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Lawmakers’ Pension 
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, (May 8, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/us/illinois-supreme-court-rejects-
lawmakers-pension-overhaul.html.  Given the amount of pensions promised, 
Illinois is expecting a 6 billion dollar budget deficit.  This occurred because for 
several decades, Illinois has promised pensions but did not balance the budget 
or ensure that these pension plans would be funded as they spent money 
elsewhere, even as the obligations rose.  Monica Davey & Mary Williams 
Walsh, Pensions and Politics Fuel Crisis in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/illinois-pension-
crisis.html?_r=0; Illinois Pension Obligations, KHAN ACADEMY, 
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/history/American%20civics/americ
an-civics/v/illinois-pension-obligations (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).  Chicago in 
particular has seen its credit rating downgraded to junk status by Moody’s 
Investor’s Service.  Monica Davey, Illinois: Chicago’s Credit Rating is 
Downgraded, N.Y. TIMES, (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/us/illinois-chicagos-credit-rating-is-
downgraded.html.  As the state continues to deliberate how to fund these 
pensions, Rahm Emmanual, the mayor of Chicago, has asked for the Teacher’s 
union to allow the city to forestall 500 million dollars of payments due at the 
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especially in workplaces without unions, reductions in retiree 
healthcare were swift and often unchallenged.111  Many 
employers simply eliminated retiree health coverage 
altogether.112 
If the explanation provided by the Tackett plaintiffs is 
accurate, their story is essentially one of a different, but 
understandable response.  While the public sector continues to 
grapple with the fallout from GASB 45 and its implications for 
municipal bankruptcy,113 and non-unionized employers made 
fairly nimble adjustments as required by FAS 106 to their 
benefit plans,114 the Tackett story (and that of the plaintiffs in 
the Whirlpool and Kelsey-Hayes cases) is likewise a slightly 
modified tale of adjustment.  Lacking the ability to make 
unilateral changes to benefit plans that characterizes the 
 
beginning of next year.  Mark Peters & Michelle Hackman, Chicago Cuts 1,400 
Jobs as Pension Fight Drags On, WALL ST. J., (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-cuts-1-400-jobs-as-pension-fight-drags-
on-1435791297.  Further, this continued stalemate between the employees and 
the state has led to the possibility of a partial government shutdown, especially 
in light of the Illinois Supreme Court decision.  Id.; see also RACHEL BARKLEY, 
THE STATE OF STATE PENSION PLANS 2013: A DEEP DIVE INTO SHORTFALLS AND 
SURPLUSES (Morningstar 2013),  
http://images.mscomm.morningstar.com/Web/MorningstarInc/%7B43f240a0-
4c8f-47b5-bc01-45cbc9e9d33b%7D_StateofStatePensionsReport2013.pdf. 
111. From 1993 to 1994, the percentage of large companies “offering 
benefits to retirees eligible for Medicare fell from 40% to 21%.”  David A. Pratt, 
The Past, Present and Future of Retiree Health Benefits, 3 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 103, 122 (2007). 
112. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995) 
(recognizing that the company could be properly identified as an individual 
who could amend the benefit plans under ERISA); James E. Holloway & 
Douglas K.  Schneider, ERISA, FASB, and Benefit Plan Amendments: A 
Section 402(b)(3) Violation as a Loss Contingency for a Plan Amendment, 46 
DRAKE L. REV. 97, 115-17 (1997). 
113. See generally Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. 
Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE 
L. REV. 525 (2013). 
114. Susan E. Cancelosi, The Bell is Tolling: Retiree Health Benefits Post-
Health Reform, 19 ELDER L.J. 49, 64 (2011) (describing how many private 
sector employers discovered that their promises of retiree health benefits 
nearly matched or exceeded their total asset value); Larry Grudzien, The Great 
Vanishing Benefit, Employer Provided Retiree Medical Benefits: The Problem 
and Possible Solutions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 785, 786 (2006) (describing how 
some companies immediately recognized the expense of retiree health benefits 
and cut retiree medical benefits instantly as justified by the financial 
statements). 
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unorganized private sector and also the messy political process 
that has at times paralyzed the public sector,115 private, 
unionized workplaces, as they so often do, settled on repeated, 
short term fixes that would appear to satisfy shareholders, keep 
the company profitable and provide retirees with benefits they 
had every reason to believe they were entitled to. 
The cap letters and the inexplicable silence about vesting 
make the most sense when understood as a response to a painful 
move toward more transparency that made lifetime promises of 
any sort seem ridiculously expensive.  Many of the modern 
changes to post-employment benefits are rightly attributed to 
employers reacting to GASB 45 or to FAS 106.  It makes sense 
to view the relationship between the parties in Tackett through 
the same lens-indeed, it would be peculiar to think that the 
widespread changes buffeting all employers as they struggle 
with rising health care costs somehow were irrelevant to 
unionized manufacturers like M & G Polymers.116 
 
115. See supra note 110 for a discussion of how Illinois has faced years of 
public sector inaction and controversy that has now led to a pension crisis in 
the public sector.  California has begun feeling the pressure to reform its 
pension system with two cities now filing for bankruptcy, however, unions 
representing public sector employees have “vehemently defended the status 
quo, saying these benefits were promised to workers for years of serving the 
public.” Marc Lifsher, California Pension Funds are Running Dry, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-controller-pension-
website-20141114-story.html.  Further, the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (“CalPERS”) has recently been criticized in the bankruptcy 
proceedings of the city of Stockton.  Melody Peterson, California Public 
Workers May be at Risk of Losing Promised Pensions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 
2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pension-controversy-20150317-
story.html.  The Judge criticizes CalPERS “as ‘a ‘bully’ for weighing in on the 
[bankruptcy] proceedings to insist … that the city had no choice but to pay 
workers their promised pensions.” Id.  Rhode Island has also struggled to 
reform its pension system after making years of promises to its public 
employees, but these reforms could save about four billion dollars while still 
allowing the retirement system to continue.  Svea Herbst-Bayless, Rhode 
Island Argues in Court for Sweeping Pension Reform Approval, REUTERS (May 
20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/usa-rhodeisland-
pensions-idUSL1N0YB0RY20150520.  Additionally, action from the courts 
was necessary to allow Governor Christie to cut over one billion dollars from 
the New Jersey pension system.  Megan Davies & Jonathan Stempel, New 
Jersey Governor Christie Wins Court Victory Over Pension Cuts, REUTERS (June 
9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/09/us-usa-new-jersey-
pensions-idUSKBN0OP0CA20150609. 
116. The growth of healthcare expenses has risen across the world, but 
the United States has grown far more rapidly than similar countries around 
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That an employer and a union with a long relationship and 
a shared goal of presenting to shareholders the best possible 
balance sheet would opt for strategic silence seems entirely 
reasonable.  Silence was completely unnecessary in the non-
unionized private sector where employers could generally 
implement the changes they sought with little or no consultation 
with employees; in the public sector, whose unions vigorously 
opposed GASB 45117 silence was impossible once the public 
 
the world.  Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States & Selected 
OECD Countries, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-
costs/issue-brief/snapshots-health-care-spending-in-the-united-states-
selected-oecd-countries/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).  In 1980, the United States 
was roughly equivalent to Sweden in healthcare costs per capita, but now 
spends more than $3,000 more per capita on healthcare expenses.  Id. at 
Exhibit 3.  Interestingly, this is also $3,000 greater than the United States was 
spending per capita in 2008, and roughly twice as much per capita as the global 
average.  Id. at Exhibit 4B.  Additionally, the growth of United States 
healthcare spending is a “clear outlier” to many other highly developed 
countries.  U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., The Effect of Health Care 
Cost Growth on the U.S. Economy 3 (2007), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/08/healthcarecost/report.pdf; see also The 
History of Health Care Spending in 7 Graphs, WASH. POST., 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-history-of-health-care-
spending-in-7-graphs/2012/01/09/gIQAFlCCmP_gallery.html (last visited Oct. 
7, 2015). 
117. “The unions said that if governments were forced to disclose the cost 
of their plans, they would probably cut or drop them, just as companies have 
done.”  Milt Freudenheim & Mary Williams Walsh, The Next Retirement Time 
Bomb, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/business/yourmoney/the-next-retirement-
time-bomb.html.  Forcing governments to confront the amount promised to 
future retirees is a process that will help the government ascertain costs for 
programs promised but not accounted for.  Id.  Some unions have taken the 
position that the financial accounting rules are “being used to promote and 
enforce a corporate political agenda, the ending of retiree benefits.” The Attack 
on Pensions and Retirees Heats Up: GASB, UNITED ELEC., RADIO & MACH. 
WORKERS OF AM., http://www.ueunion.org/stwd_gasbfasb.html (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2015).  In 2005, the president of the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees “promised a fight if GASB is used to 
eliminate retiree health care.”  Ronald A. Wirtz, Gasping over GASB, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2006), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/gasping-over-gasb.  In 
Costa County, California, the International Federation of Professional and 
Technical Engineers has sued the county for capping its current county 
healthcare limits, which has resulted in going “against the spirit of the 
negotiated language” because the county is worried about their “bond rating” 
and the “appear[ance] to hav[ing] greater liabilities on their books.”  Mike 
Seville, Unions Seek Creatively, Financially Sound Solutions to Protect Retiree 
Healthcare, TWENTY ONE, Winter 2014, at 4-5 (Twenty One is the quarterly 
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learned of the extraordinarily generous benefits that its tax 
dollars were supporting.118 
In the shrinking private and organized part of the economy 
though, strategic silence was a perfectly reasonable response, 
albeit a risky one for retirees.  If the Sixth Circuit on remand 
focuses carefully on the four factors identified by the justices 
who wrote in concurrence, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the Tackett plaintiffs (the current retirees) will hold onto their 
free health care benefits. 
The parties’ long history of bargaining, combined with the 
industry specific practice of cap letters and side agreements,119 
and other extrinsic evidence that suggests the retirees’ reliance 
was not misplaced and that both parties almost certainly 
understood what was really going on.  The major obstacle to a 
“win” for the Tackett retirees is not common and widely accepted 
rules of contract interpretation, Yard-Man notwithstanding.  
The central problem is that employers like M & G Polymers 
simply cannot afford to honor the promises they made implicitly 
and which they did honor for a long time. 
Justice Thomas’ opinion in Tackett is not so much a rejection 
of Yard-Man (although it certainly sidelines that decision) as it 
is a practical way out of a problem that threatens to overwhelm 
many employers.  The obvious solution for retirees in non-
physically demanding industries is to remain employed until at 
least age 65 when Medicare eligibility is triggered.120  For those 
who simply cannot continue to work past age 50 or 55 (a not 
uncommon reality in mining, steel, auto and other 
 
publication of IFPTE Local 21). 
118. While there is difficulty computing the exact value of government 
employee pensions, “the average public pension is several times more generous 
than 401(k)-style plans in the private sector.” Jason Richwine, The Real Cost 
of Public Pensions, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (May 31, 2012), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/the-real-cost-of-public-
pensions. 
119. See supra note 18 (referring to exhibits admitted into evidence for 
the Tackett litigation). 
120. “Every individual who . . . (2) has attained age 65 and is a resident 
of the United States, and is either (A) a citizen or (B) an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence who has resided in the United States continuously 
during the 5 years immediately preceding the month in which he applies for 
enrollment under this part, is eligible to enroll in the insurance program 
established by this part.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2). 
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manufacturing jobs)121 some sort of legislative solution is 
required to fill the new gap.  The catch of course is that the 
Medicare program’s finances are already shaky122 and the 
political will needed to expand the program is not certain.123 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent unanimous decision in Tackett 
rejects the Yard-Man inference which only ever enjoyed limited 
 
121. Injuries present in these professions similar to the steel and mining 
industry could lead to necessary retirement due to workplace related injuries, 
disabilities, and even death.  Highest Incidence Rates of Total Nonfatal 
Occupational Injury and Illness Cases, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2013), 
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/ostb3962.pdf (referencing Table SNR01, 
titled Highest Incident Rates of Total Nonfatal Occupational Injury and Illness 
Cases); National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2013 (Preliminary 
Results), BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Sept. 17, 2014), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf (referencing Chart 2, showing 
that while the mining industry had decreased in number of fatal workplace 
incidents, it still reported one of the highest rates of employee death on the 
job). 
122. Susan A.  Channick, Taming the Beast of Health Care Costs: Why 
Medicare Reform Alone is Not Enough, 21 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 63, 66-68 
(2012); Jacqueline Fox, Death Panels: A Defense of the Independent Payment 
Advisory Board, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 135-38 (2014); Thomas L. Greaney, 
Controlling Medicare Costs: Moving Beyond Inept Administered Pricing and 
Ersatz Competition, 6 ST.  LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 229, 230-31 (2013); 
Sharon R. Kaufman, Medicare’s Next Half-Century, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/medicares-next-half-
century/; Sally C.  Pipes, Medicare at 50: Hello, Mid-Life Crisis, WALL ST. J. 
(July 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/medicare-at-50-hello-mid-life-
crisis-1438211061; Michael D. Shear & Robert Pear, Older Pool of Health Care 
Enrollees Stirs Fears on Costs, N.Y.  TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/us/health-care-plans-attracting-more-
older-less-healthy-people.html; The Times Editorial Board, Medicare and 
Medicaid at 50: Successful, Expensive, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-medicare-medicaid-50-
20150730-story.html; Christopher Weaver et al., Medicare Overpays as 
Hospital Prices Rise, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/medicare-overpays-as-hospital-prices-rise-
1429151451. 
123. See supra note 109; see also Robert Pear, U.S. Proposes Cuts to Rates 
in Medicare Payments, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/us/politics/us-proposes-cuts-to-rates-in-
medicare-payments.html; Medicare Advantage, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (June 29, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-
advantage/ (citing that Medicare Advantage plans could largely be at the 
whims of private companies operating these types of plans). 
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support outside of the Sixth Circuit.  The central contribution of 
the opinion is its clear reaffirmation that traditional principles 
of contract interpretation—the primacy of unambiguous 
language, the role of industry specific customs and the 
availability of extrinsic evidence in light of ambiguity—apply in 
cases where the parties have failed to be explicit and, in doing 
so, essentially gambled about future litigation.  For the Tackett 
plaintiffs-current retirees who are, by definition not well suited 
to obtaining new employment and/or alternate sources of 
employer-based health insurance-the only moderately optimistic 
way forward requires a coherent explanation of the years of 
silence surrounding an important and increasingly expensive 
benefit. 
The story needs to include an explanation of the years long 
practice of not talking about the unacknowledged but well 
understood expectation of retirees that their benefits would 
always be free and would last for life.  The role of the cap letters 
as a mechanism for controlling risk will be critical to this 
process.  If the retirees can characterize their own strategic 
behavior as a calculated response to the post FAS 106 world—a 
world that was materially different from the experience of 
unorganized workers in the private sector—they will maximize 
the chances of holding on to their employer sponsored health 
care. 
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